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Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
I keep reading hints that Operation Bodenplatte was far more successful and destructive than the official (US written) history suggests. Something about French or Polish aviators gossiping about vast destruction, many more aircraft destroyed than officially recorded, a scandal and a coverup.
From Wikipedia: The results of the raid are difficult to judge given the confusion over loss records. It is likely more aircraft were destroyed than listed. The Americans failed to keep a proper record of their losses and it appears the U.S. 8th Air Force losses were not included in loss totals. When these estimates and figures are added to the losses listed in the table below, it is likely that the correct figures are 232 destroyed (143 single-engine, 74 twin-engine and 15 four-engine) and 156 damaged (139 single-engine, 12 twin-engine and five four-engine). Researching individual squadron records confirms the destruction of even more USAAF aircraft. This suggests at least a further 16 B-17s, 14 B-24s, eight P-51s, and at least two P-47s were destroyed on top of that total. A total of 290 destroyed and 180 damaged seems a more realistic summation than the conservative figures given by the USAAF, RAF, and RCAF. Including the 15 Allied aircraft shot down and 10 damaged in aerial combat, 305 destroyed and 190 damaged is the sum total of the attack.[125] I ran a search using, "Bodenplatte" but for whatever reason I couldn't find a relevant thread on this matter. Has anyone reconciled the Allied loss records for that day to get the real story? And regardless, what is the real story? I suppose the fundamental question is: In theory, was Operation Bodenplatte a bad idea? That is, with an attacking force of skilled and experienced pilots would it have been a bad idea, or was it a bad idea only because the attacking force was comprised of mostly unskilled and inexperience pilots? Bronc |
Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
John & Ron’s book written in 2004 on Bodenplatte will answer all such questions
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Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
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Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
The US government deliberately deceiving the public with false narratives? Come, come now.
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Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
As stated, read the book and if you have any questions, please post them here.
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Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
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For a German perspective, check out "Six Months to Oblivion" by Werner Girbig (Schiffer, 1991). FWIW, here are some other secondary resources:
Leon Venter |
Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
I have, Six Months to Oblivion by Werner Girbig (Schiffer, 1991) which from the German perspective paints a rather catastrophic picture of the mission.
Question: Six Months to Oblivion describes the incredible secrecy and compartmentalized planning that the Bodenplatte operation received. Was this because Hitler and the Luftwaffe/German high command finally began to suspect that the Allies were reading their mail (on a minute by minute basis?) Are there any opinions on the fundamental question: In theory, was Operation Bodenplatte a bad idea? That is, with an attacking force of skilled and experienced pilots would it have been a bad idea, or was it a bad idea only because the attacking force was comprised of mostly unskilled and inexperience pilots? I cannot find any relevant discussion of this matter in the "Books and Magazines" section. Help? Bronc |
Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
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No, because deciphered German signals had been giving clear indications since November that fighter units were being massed on Western airfields in preparation for some major operation. For example: SG 4 was brought in; III./JG 26 carried out four flights to practice low-level attacks; courses for National Socialist Leadership Officers were cancelled because of an "impending special operation"; all Kommodores and Gruppenkommandeurs (except JG 300 and 301) were called to a special conference at Jagdkorps II HQ on 5 December; nightfighters were assigned to fighter units "to assure assembly of strong day fighter forces in bad weather; and so on. Source: National Archives HW 13/45 "Report on indications of German December 1944 counter-offensive in Ardennes, derived from ULTRA material, submitted to DMI by C". |
Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
Also CAB 106/1224. I suspect content may be incredibly similar to Nick's file
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Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
Rather than deception, I think the ambiguity in US losses from Bodenplate is coming from US documentation attitude. We have two rather exhaustive databases, the MACR covering the aircrew missing in action (and by way of consequence most of the times their aircraft) and the accident reports. The first help to find the fate of the missing crew, and the second helps to establish how and why the accident occurs.
Any operational loss without a missing crew (for example a pilot bailing out over friendly territory and surviving) or a ground loss in an emeny raid like Bodenplatte will not be listed in the above reports, and should be searched elsewhere. Another issue is the aircraft not totally destroyed but just damaged. They will often not be counted as losses, but could very well never been repaired, especially so late in the war. In this case they will probably be struck of charges months later, and not be counted for war losses. I have read for example that the US losses for the raid on Rabaul on 2 November 1943 include only aircraft failing from return and that many other were actually never repaired, but I have never seen figures for the latter. As for Bodenplatte being a success or a failure, my own opinion is that it was the second. Germany was running out of experienced pilots and lost many of them in this operation, while the Allied air forces losses were essentially material and were quickly replaced. Also at this stage the German offensive was stopped and there was no more use to disable the Allied tactical air forces for some days. If this operation could have been launched in the first days of the offensive, it may have more impact, even if the German offensive will still have failed IMHO. On the other hand the Jagdwaffe has been heavily engaged since the start of the offensive and its losses before Bodenplatte were heavier than during the ooeration itself (but on a longer period, I agree). And even when German pilots shot down tens of B-26s in one day, that was not sufficient to protect the German troops. So the option to fight the Allied tactical forces in the air rather than on the ground was no more efficient than Bodenplatte. Bodenplatte is IMHO related to the German concept of a decisive battle often used by the Wermacht, while the Allied forces were actually fighting an attrition warfare that they knew they will win. Even if ideas of decisive battles were also used on the Allied side (like Market Garden or the BC campain against Berlin). |
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