[tcolvin]

I think we should probably leave it there.


We know 'what was', ie what 2TAF did, due to the good work of Chris Thomas and Christopher Shores; there are no questions and no debate about the results of their research from me.


We don't know, however, “what ought to have been”, which is a normative question, and cannot follow from “what was”.


Thr normative aspect is raised because claims made by RAF and USAAF pilots of 2TAF (firing RPs) , IXTAC and XIXTAC (both of which were “dive-bombing”) were proved by 2 ORS investigators to be overstated by a factor of at least ten. Source: Joint Report No. 1 by 2 ORS which examined an area in the Ardennes Salient where pilots claimed 90 AFVs destroyed. 2 ORS found 101 destroyed AFVs, of which only 7 were due to air attack. 2 ORS interviewed captured Germans; eg “Signaller W of 130 Pz Regt said that when conditions were favourable they were attacked from the air as often as 3 times a day. No tanks had been put out of action by the air force. A bomb fell 10 metres from his tank but no damage was caused”.


All of this is old hat to most/all of you, and no excuse for starting this thread.


However new information appeared - Bill Simpson's book, which is not about 2TAF but about Fighter Command and their task of stopping the V2 launches from the Hague. The rockets were terrifying and killing large numbers of Londoners (over 2,700). The army had messed up by neglecting to free the Scheldt and liberate northern Netherlands, and instead run into a brick wall at Arnhem. Six squadrons were used against the V2s, and were at it for a period of over 5 months. They did everything they could with the equipment at their disposal. Not for them 2TAF's 60 degree dive angle with release at 3,000 ft, but 70+ degrees with release sometimes as low as 1,500 ft and straight into heavy Flak. They failed almost completely, according to Bill Simpson, who shows that V2 launchings continued even when the RAF was overhead in strength, (although the Spitfires did cause the Gemans to fire more at night, which probably reduced casualties because Londoners were not so concentrated together in groups as they were during the day).


The RAF had always rejected specialist dive-bombing, and managed to fight off all demands from the Army for its own air corps equipped with specialist dive-bombers. The RAF claimed complete vindication when they shot the Stukas out of the skies over southern England. They never publicly wavered in their rejection of specialist dive-bombers, although they had to suppress the news about the success of the Vengeance in the Far East which achieved the required accuracy and performed far better than was possible with the abused Spitfires. However, when faced with the demand to hit V2 launchers in the woods surrounded by the built-up area of the Hague, RAF Fighter Command was forced to try and achieve the accuracy of specialist dive-bombers without the kit. Ditto 2TAF who had to support the army by destroying tiny targets such as tanks, anti-tank guns and machine-gun nests using kit without the necessary accuracy. The Allies enjoyed complete air superiority, so the Stuka excuse was irrelevant.


It seems to me indisputable that the RAF should have been using their Vengeances over North West Europe and especially the Hague. These would probably have needed teaming with Austers and Stinsons (notoriously difficult to shoot down) to spot V2 launcher movement in the Hague, in air-to-air communication with a cab-rank of Vengeances. Maybe this would have shut the V2s down, or maybe not. The point is, it was never even raised AFAIK.


And, to repeat, history shows it would be wise to leave it there.


Tony