[rob van den nieuwendijk]

Hello Tony,

I will take the liberty of quoting from Air 41/55 where I found some interesting data:

Page 255:
Counter-Measures to Rockets
Just as counter-measures against flying bombs fell largely upon the air defences of Great Britain, so thoese against rockets were principally carried out by Fighter Command. 2nd Tactical Air Force assisted in the work of armed reconnaissance by attacking transport targets over much of Holland, leaving the rocket launching areas used for the attack of London to Fighter Command. But these activities were part of the constant offensive by continentally based aircraft against communications between the battle area and western Germany…

The heavy bomber forces were not used in the period directly against rocket targets.

(…) page 258

… the offensive took the form of sweeps and reconnaissances in which fighters and fighter-bombers attacked targets of opportunity rather than specific, pre-selected objectives. This was work better suited to 2nd Tactical Air Force than Fighter Command: first, because to be effective a large number of sorties was needed – and 2nd Tactical Air Force was a much stronger force than Fighter Command; second, because 2nd Tactical Air Froce was continentally based within easy reach of the areas to be attacked, whereas Fighter Command squadrons had to fly over a hundred miles across the sea before they reached western Holland. The sorties flown over Holland and north-west Germany by the two forces reflect the differences: for the period 15 October – 25 November they were only six hundred by Fighter Command and nearly ten thousand by 2nd Tactical Air Force.

Page 261
Air Marshall Hill wrote to the Air Ministry on 17 November, making his letter the occasion for a thorough review of the difficulties under which Fighter Command had been operating. He pointed out that the armed reconnaissance had to be carried out by Spitfires in daylight whenever weather permitted, and as winter approached their scale of effort was being seriously affected. Moreover, the majority of sorties had to be flown at low altitude if the pilots were to identify suitable targets and attack them with cannon and machine-gun fire; and this in an area where the Germans had deployed a large number of light anti-aircraft guns was a dangerous proceeding. (…) Here, Bomber Command and 2nd Tactical Air Force could help, though so far they had done very little. A number of sorties were also being flown by bomb-carrying Spitfires of Fighter Command whose pilots were, however, under strict instructions not to bomb if there was any risk of causing civilian casualties. It was particularly in this last connection that Air Marshal Hill wanted a revision of policy. (…) at a conference on 21 November (…) and members of the Dutch Government were present. The latter agreed that of bombing attacks on launching points and storage sites were indeed considered necessary and likely to prove effective they would raise no objection at this stage. (…) Hill was therefore given authority to undertake such attacks even against targets near built-up areas, provided he considered them “reasonably discriminating”. This applied only to Fighter Command and its fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. No alteration was made in ‘Crossbow’ policy as it affected 2nd Tactical Air Force and Bomber Command. Air Chief Marshal Tedder put the claims of the battle on land on 2nd Tactical Air Force higher than the needs of rocket counter-measures.

And on it goes in air 41/55. Trust the above is of interest.

Best regards,
Rob