[tcolvin]

I've read Raymond Baxter (Tales of My Time), Cabell & Thomas (Operation Big Ben), Shores & Thomas (2TAF Vol 4), Simpson (Spitfire Dive-Bombers Versus the V2) and Smith (The History of Dive Bombing), and conclude the following;

1. The claims of accuracy that I remember objecting to in Christopher Shores 1970 book “2nd TAF” have been radically, and correctly, revised. Shores & Thomas state; “The RP was not a precision weapon” and “dive-bombing ... accuracy was in the same order as that in the alternative – low-level bombing”. Neither, however, is quantified. But the implication that the RAF did not do accuracy is entirely correct as the RAF refused to operate specialised dive-bombers or aircraft equipped with anti-tank guns, and rejected even minimal fitment of armour.
2. Shores & Thomas do not always spell out the consequences of their conclusion that the RAF did not do accuracy. I'll give two examples; “All types of bridges could succomb to dive-bombing, but it required a high degree of accuracy”. If bridges were defended – such as those at Wesel during Op Veritable – 2TAF simply left them alone, and they were destroyed by the Germans after their withdrawal. Another example; “There was, however, little doubt about the effectiveness of RP in the British and Canadian Armies, as they relied upon, and much appreciated, the Typhoon rocket attacks that went in immediately before their assault on German positions”. It's true the soldiers enjoyed watching the RP fireworks, and many wrongly believed RP was accurate, but it would be a mistake to think all the infantry were deceived. Maj Harry Illing, a company commander in 2 Warwicks in 3rd British Infantry Division, said he would have swapped a Typhoon for a 25-pdr any day, because the gun-howitzer was accurate, reliable and always available. There is truth in the old saw that all the infantry actually did was accompany the Artillery FOO from La Breche to Bremen, with 2TAF an irrelevance.
3. The big claim made for 2TAF was effective interdiction. This claim, however, cannot be quantified, and often fails to withstand scrutiny. Shores & Thomas; “Interdiction .... was also effective ... against the V2 rockets ... difficult to locate ... only recourse was to curtail their supplies of fuel and replacement rockets by cutting the railway supply lines”. Cabell & Thomas examined this claim; “it is unlikely that .. rocket batteries were unaffected by these attacks, but those by 2TAF were not carried out specifically for that purpose.... their real strength, in and near the Hague, were not directly attacked ...... attacks on the railway bridge at Deventer, Zwolle and Zutphen which carried communications to the Hague. 2TAF was therefore considered to be making a contribution to defence against rockets”. Cabell & Thomas do not agree with Simpson about the effectiveness of the RAF's contribution to the campaign against the V2s. Cabell & Thomas; “it is not right to state that the horror of the V2s was only quashed when ground troops went in”, which was the claim made by Lord Alanbrooke (“typical bloody soldier”, being F/Lt Raymond Baxter's response). Simpson, however, agreed with Alanbrooke; “a very firm conclusion has to be that the attacks of both the 12 Group Spitfires and the aircraft of 2TAF did not (author's emphasis) bring the V2 campaign to an end – the reason they stopped was the advance of the Allied armies .... They did not come to an end because of the air attacks alone”.
4. It cannot, IMHO, be gainsaid that the RAF's refusal to operate a specialist and accurate dive-bomber was an unmitigated disaster for Britain. Any number of quotations and sources could be produced in evidence. Here is one from a practitioner, the CO of 84 Squadron, Arthur Gill, who operated both Blenheim bombers and Vengeance dive-bombers; “We had little hope of inflicting much damage! It seemed such a waste of effort. Dive-bombing with the Vengeance in Burma, however, taught us what it meant to be accurate! For example, to take out vital bridges, I could usually send just a couple of Vengeances in with the almost guaranteed certainty that the bridge would be demolished, whereas with the Blenheim I could take the squadron against the same target day after day and rarely, if ever, score a hit”. The RAF categorically refused to support the army with anything but Battles, Blenheims, updated Blenheims and fighter-bombers, consigning the accurate Hurricane IID and Vengeance to the operational scrapheap. As the Americans say, “Go figure”.

Tony