[tcolvin]

HI, Juha,

There were other factors that explain the relative ineffectiveness of the AngloCanadianAmerican armed forces compared with that of their Russian allies.

With reference to the V2 campaign, the problems that ADGB/Fighter Command never solved were a) target spotting/identification b) accuracy and c) Flak resistance, which fed back to degrade item a). The Vengeance, however, scored on all counts; a) the forward-facing observer and pilot were more than twice as likely to see and identify a V2 than just the pilot b) the vertically-diving Vengeance was more accurate than the Spitfire XVI, and c) Spitfires never descended below 3,000ft (Cabell page 90) over the Hague because of risks from Flak to the exposed hydraulics and engine radiators, while the Vengeance, being 'built like a tank' and air-cooled, was more resistant to Flak - but could and should have carried more armour - and therefore logically could have descended further.

Cabell page 96 makes the revealing statement that the presence or absence of rockets could be determined by studying aerial photographs of the Haagsche Bosch and Duindigit areas, while Spitfire pilots by implication could not see or identify the rockets, and so could not attack them, even if they were there in plain view to the cameras of PR Spitfires. Spitfire XVIs were often continuously over the areas but the pilots never 'saw' the rockets until after they were launched, even though the rockets were visible.

This reflected the main problem which 2TAF never solved when supporting the army. The single-crewed Spitfires and Typhoons could usually find the area identified by the Army as containing a machine gun/tank/howitzer/88-mm, but they couldn't see the camouflaged target. Therefore 2TAF came to identify success in exactly the same way as Bomber Command, which openly admitted its task was to "cart bombs to Germany". 2TAF implicitly defined its task as 'carting' bombs or RPs to the approximate area specified by the army, and went home proclaiming success provided they had found the right map reference. (On this criterion the crews of the mediums that laid waste to Bezuidenhaut were 'fully successful' because they correctly dropped their ordnance on the wrong map reference, which was not their responsibility).

Such equivocation, or even prevarication, never washed with the Russian army which had the power to decide whether the VVS had succeeded in target destruction or not, which in the end is the only thing that counts. If the target continued to fire, the aircraft was told to go back until the target was destroyed. Hence the high losses from alerted Flak defences even though the IL-2 carried armour. The independent RAF rejected any such definition of success, which was in the end why it could shrug off the need for accuracy. Only the Butt Report on Bomber Command, and the 21 Army Group Operational Research sections, were ever in a position to prove that RAF claims were fictional in terms of effectiveness.

This has led, IMHO, to the RAF's emphasis on the unquantified and unquantifiable effect of 2TAF RPs, and of Bomber Command's area bombing, on 'morale', and the unquantified and unquantifiable claims of 2TAF on the effectiveness of interdiction.

Many pilots, such as Desmond Scott and Charles Demoulin (609 Squadron), were convinced of their pivotal role in the Allied victory, but the facts do not support them.
'It was the day of the eagle, yet it was General Montgomery who accepted the accolade. Back in 1942, the build-up of the Desert Air Force under Air Marshal Coningham had lifted General Montgomery above the level of his unfortunate predecessors and placed him on the pedestal of public popularity. Tedder or Coningham were seldom mentioned. In their (the soldiers') eyes he became a god of war who could do no wrong. But the view that aircraft and their pilots were expendable, mere weapons of convenience, rang a discordant note in the ears of all of those who flew. The Tactical Air Force rocket-firing Typhoons and fighter-bombers, maintained a successful interdiction of the Seine bridges and ensured victory in the land battles before they had even begun, crippling the enemy's armour as it lay waiting in the hedgerows. As an airman I must here speak up on behalf of every branch of the Allied Air force. Their role has consistently been understated'. Desmond Scott.
'the role played by 2 TAF in general and by the Typhoons in particular were the determining factor of Allied victory in Normandy'. Charles Demoulin.



I hold no brief for Montgomery, who was a disaster and should have been fired in July 1944. His failures - to open Antwerp and at Arnhem - were predictable since he had form, but by the autumn of 1944 there was general acceptance in the Anglo-American armies that only the Russians would finish the job.
Nor is Churchill blameless, since he had the responsibility and the power to sack Montgomery and to rein in the RAF, but failed to do so.

Tony