[Graham Boak]

It would be interesting to learn the mechanism whereby the RAF "suppressed" information regarding aircraft operated by other air forces.

I suspect the RAF could foresee the Luftwaffe losing command of the air. What it couldn't do is rely upon that assumption. What it could rely on was the success of light flak in suppressing the operation of slow large targets over the battlefield. It had learnt that hard lesson over Masstricht in 1940, if nowhere else. The real enemy of the Allied dive bomber was not the RAF but the Quad 20mm.

As for a long range fighter: Portal was looking for such an aircraft from a very early date. Just why do you think the RAF wanted the Merlin Mustang, and why it was not available for FR duties in 1944/45? To claim a lack of interest inside the RAF for such an aircraft is provably wrong. What it could not do was immediately alter the previous design emphasis on high rate of climb.

Given air superiority, as you yourself argue, aircraft of lesser performance can operate successfully. It would make little sense to swap priorities and place the very highest performing aircraft into ground attack and let your inferior fighters fail to gain that very necessary superiority. However, you completely overlook the matter of differential altitude performance. The Allison Mustang was a much better aircraft at low level than higher, that is why it makes sense to operate it in a role that demands just that. Particularly as the numbers available and the numbers required were close. The same argument applies to the Typhoon. There was little or nothing inferior about it at low-level. It makes sense to employ it there.

If, as you argue, the RAF was only interested in dumping inferior aircraft into the tactical role, there were an awful lot of Spitfire Mk.Vs that could have been so employed - but weren't. The RAF employed the right horses for courses, when it could.