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Old 22nd July 2010, 12:51
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Juha Juha is offline
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Re: Why the USAAF gave up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47.

Hello Tony
not wanting to defend too much Harris, whom also I think was much too single-minded, but

Quote: “For example - where was BC when the U-Boat pens were being built? Answer, bombing Germany. Only when Britain faced starvation, and the completed U-boat pens were beyond the possibility of destruction, was Harris told by Churchill to bomb them. BC destroyed the French ports but never damaged a submarine. Is that a sensible way to run a war?”

IMHO that was more a double error of CID, if that is the right term, than Harris. Harris should have ordered to attack pens when they were under construction and should have allowed to give them less attention until Tallboys were ready after it was found out that even 2000lb AP bombs were inadequate against the pens. And with Tallboys bombers did damage at least some U-boats IIRC even sunk a couple or so. Halifaxis from 35 Sqn, not sure on sqn, hit Scharnhorst with 6 1000lb AP bombs at La Pallice during one daring and costly daytime raid. It wasn’t fault of those crews that all 6 went straight through the ship without exploding.

Quote:” The COS complained, but got nowhere with Churchill and Harris.”

Modern societies were built in that way, civilians had the last say. Now of course it would have been better that also Harris would have using his influence for a more flexible way to use bombers but one can also argue that if COS couldn’t persuade WC, most of blame should went on WC and his Cabined colleagues and some even to COS, it was up to them to find correct arguments to convince their civilian bosses to see their points. As one of your quotes said, Harris did what he was ordered as best he could, even if protesting, even direct ground support. If allowed to do what he wanted he bombed the cities and not was not giving enough attention to experts of Ministry of Economic Warfare, but when given an order he did what was told.

On Kennedy, now there had been some 100 Wimpys in NA (7 sqns) also much of RAF meagre torpedo-bomber force and some FAA anti-shipping sqns. Not checking front line strength of BC at the time I’d say that the NA Wimpy force wasn’t far from 20% of BC’s front-line strength. So not an insignificant force. And there is a limit, how many bombers one could operate effectively from a far away place. Don’t know how much more bombs were logistically possible to delivery to Egypt, light and fighter bombers also used lots of them, fuel probably was not a problem. The limit was,t already reached, because RAF was able to deploy 2 Hali sqns when the crises arose and keep the 2 Lib sqns, which were in their way to Far East, in NA for summer months of 42.

Juha