[tcolvin]

Hi Juha,

PzGr 43 (APCR or HVAP) was surely more than scarce; it was unavailable in 1945 due to lack of tungsten, with all supplies reserved for machine tools.

The poor A/T performance of the 75mm L40 was not a problem in infantry support which required HE performance, and that was good. In any case 20% of Churchills were equipped with 6pdr APDS. And towed Allied A/T guns were outstanding, especially the 17pdr.

Theoretically the aerial FOO could have directed the artillery to destroy or mask the 88-mm/StuGs, which were usually placed among farm buildings. But from my reading they usually couldn't, or didn't.

The required weapon was an accurately placed bomb from a dive-bomber, or an aimed shell fired from an aircraft, or an immune tank.

Black Prince running gear would have eliminated front-heaviness, which existed in any case with most tanks because they unofficially welded a ton or more of track links to hull and turret fronts in a vain attempt to keep out the 88-mm.

No; I haven't checked whether the Meteor fitted, and it is not crucial to my argument. It would have been nice to have.
And BTW, the Churchills outran the Cromwell and Sherman cruiser tanks of 21AG on the east bank of the Rhine, simply because cruisers could not deal as well as the Churchills with the poor roads and periodic road blocks.

Woods were a problem in Op Veritable, but most of the holdup during the 30 days occurred on the rolling and open land between the Reichswald and Wesel, particularly the approach to the Hochwald Layback, which gave the 88-mm wide fields of fire.

Infantry protected the Churchills against Panzerfaust/Panzerschrek. Sherman flail tanks cleared the mines. The unsolved problem was the 88-mm DP and the StuG. StuGs, however, were confined to the roads while the Churchills could travel across country.
Attacks were usually planned to minimise the possibility of enfilade by 50mm and 75mm Paks. These were in fact usually placed across the Stuetzpunkt to deal with the cruisers and recce Stuarts, with the 88-mms placed in enfilade position to stop any (rare) breakthrough.

Crocodiles had a place, but Hobart should never have been allowed to take almost all of the available Mk VIIs - see below.

You ask how many add-on armour sets were fitted on older models. AFAIK all older models were retrofitted. Since you're interested, I will beg the indulgence of those not interested in AFVs, and cut-and-paste what I know about Churchill tanks in 1945.

"On January 21, 1945, 21 Army Group disposed of 1,011 Churchills against an establishment of 496, representing a margin of over 100%, and with enough to equip a Canadian armoured brigade. About one quarter of all Churchills, or 245 units, were Mk VIIs, but only a negligible 4% or 18 units, had been issued to the gun-tank battalions; 5 were with the Czech Brigade and 13 with 6 Guards Tank Brigade. The other six battalions had none, although there were 110 surplus Mk VIIs even after 7 RTR had been newly equipped with Crocodiles. J.G. Smith of 141 Regiment RAC provided a reason why these Mk VIIs were not distributed to the gun-tank units;
‘At this stage all Mk VIIs on the Continent were sent to us. The reason lay in its armour being about twice as thick as that of the earlier marks. This was necessary as our work entailed very close support of the infantry and reduction in manoeuvrability due to the trailer.’
Gun-tanks worked in perhaps even closer support with the infantry than did Crocodiles, while the trailer significantly impeded manoeuvrability only when trying to reverse. Smith’s contemporary observation would appear to be Hobart’s rationalization of his parsimonious distribution of Mk VII gun-tanks.
The Mk VII made up nine percent of Churchills in 6 Guards Tank Brigade, which meant that only one or two were available in each squadron of 15 tanks. Compounding this problem of scarcity was an inability to take advantage of the Mk VII’s superiority. They seem to have been used interchangeably with the Mk VI, and given no special assignment. All Churchills were allocated to crews in the Guards by ‘the luck of the draw’, and it is now impossible to know where the 13 Mk VIIs went and how they were used. Some users, such as Charles Farrell and John Macdonald-Buchanan of 3 Scots Guards, seem to have been unaware of the scarcity of Mk VIIs or even of their existence. With the exception of 203 Mk III, IV and VI with 6-pdrs firing the exceptional armour-piercing sabot, all marks were retrofitted with a 75-mm gun and appliqué side armour and became difficult to distinguish apart from the round doors and front hatches in the hull. Frontal armour of non-Mk VIIs was not improved, and this was the vulnerable part of any Infantry tank."

Tony