[tcolvin]

I don't look down on details, Kutscha, but I believe the high standard of British staff work ensured consideration of the type of detailed objection you raise, and in so doing would have found alternatives – such as moving by sea.


Please consider this timeline:


Feb 5; Hitler wrote to Mussolini offering the help of an armoured division on condition the Italians did not retreat to Tripoli.
Feb 9; British Army reached El Agheila.
Feb 10; Mussolini accepted Hitler's offer.
Feb 11 am; Rommel arrived in Rome where he was assured the Italians would stand at Sirte.
Feb 11 pm; Rommel arrived in Catania where he received grave news; “Wavell had taken Benghazi, destroyed the last Italian armoured formation south of the town and was about to advance into Tripolitania ... It was not impossible that the next few days would see the arrival of the leading British troops in the outer environs of Tripoli. As the first German division would not be complete in Africa until the middle of April, its help would come too late if the enemy continued his offensive. Something had to be done at once to bring the British offensive to a halt”. (Rommel Papers). That “something” was this cable telling Wavell to abandon Tripoli and go to Greece.
Feb 11 pm; Cable from CIGS to Wavell; “This problem has been heavily discussed by Defence Committee last two days. I put it up. General feeling is that assistance to Greece and/or Turkey must come first apart from strain on Navy and RAF which advance to Tripoli would involve. Official wire will follow tonight”.


And please consider this passage from a letter written by Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India, to the CIGS on February 1, 1941 (which was never sent);
“ .... the Germans and Italians have probably ruled out a rapid advance on Tripoli as beyond Wavell's powers. They may do so all the more if, as is likely, he finds himself held up in the broken country between Derna and Benghazi [NB, he wasn't]. On the other hand I doubt whether there are any technical difficulties about the advance beyond Benghazi, the first few hundred miles of which are along a motor road most of it close to the sea, and through sheer desert. I doubt whether a rapid advance, even with a comparatively small mechanised force, would meet any serious resistance the greater part of the way, especially if the heavier stuff, infantry, artillery, etc, and stores came along by sea. For Wavell in his particular situation, sea transport should take the place that troop-carrying lorry transport did for the Germans last May; but with this difference - that our troop-carrying vessels cannot only support the mechanised advance, but even, if necessary, go ahead of it for the purpose of outflanking the enemy. Similarly, in our light balloon-tyred armoured fighting vehicles we have something which can move across the desert a good deal faster than the Italians can, and so should be in a position to out-flank them on the land side as well. All this taken together suggests that against a swift rush Wavell will find no serious resistance, or if he does, can envelop and mop it up as he mopped up Bardia and Tobruk.
The biggest danger facing such an advance is if the Germans are given time to establish a powerful air force in Tripoli. But this means not merely flying the aircraft across, but somehow shipping across from Sicily all the cumbrous ground establishments required. No doubt they are thinking of doing this, but they may well be too late if Wavell comes along much faster than they expect......” (John Connell, Wavell, page 322).


Tony