[RodM]

After having a read of the thesis, my own opinion is that it is an important addition to the debate of the strategic air offensive.

Having said that, I feel that the author has missed the point in several areas and not delved into several complex issues.

I actually find it offensive that the author should emphasize a calculation of the cost for each German civilian killed, as if this is the marker upon which the success of the SBC should be judged. In fact, the calculation is completely irrelevant. Of more importance would be comparing the cost to Germany of defending against and repairing the damage caused by the SBC, not to mention the simple expedient that Bomber Command was an offensive weapon that, along with the USAAF, diverted a fair portion of German output to defence - output that otherwise been used for offensive over the British Isles. I would maintain that Germany's failure to mount a proper and sustained strategic campaign against the UK as a base of war operations was a grave mistake. Whether Germany could have mounted such a sustained campaign, considering that it had ultimately 'bitten off more than it could chew' once America had joined the European war, is another matter.

In terms of the construction and maintenance of airfields and infrastructure, I don't believe that one can separate the needs of Bomber Command from that of the USAAF. To that end, if the investment had not been made in Bomber Command, how would the USAAF strategic bomber force have fared in establishing itself in the UK? The USAAF in the UK relied heavily on RAF support in a number of areas, including the infrastructure set up to aid Bomber Command. To suggest that the investment in Bomber Command infrastructure was a cost that Britain could not afford, would automatically call into question the parallel USAAF SBC. I don't believe these two issues can be separated.

Nor do I see detailed analysis of the offsetting of costs against reverse lend-lease. A question I would be asking is did Britain get full economic value from technological advances and research shared with America? While the military value of this sharing undoubtedly bore fruit in American manufacturing of and improvements to British technology in the fields of both the aeronautics and electronics, to what extent did America economically profit to the detriment of Britain in the post-war years because of technology provided to the Americans for no real direct economic recompense?

The author also places emphasis on the wastage due to the dissolution of a substantial portion of Bomber Command in the immediate post-war years, without exploring the late-war requirements of fighting Japan, and the planned deployment of 'Tiger Force'; plans only made redundant by the Japanese surrender after the Atomic bombings. That Britain could reduce this war material to scrap only came about because the Allies defeated the Axis powers and the Soviet Union did not 'liberate' western Europe.

Tony, most of your theories are based on the notion/belief that Bomber Command operations had no political or material effect against Germany and its ability to wage war, and were thus a complete waste of effort. Many people flatly disagree with this notion, including Webster/Frankland in the Official History (which, in my view, is one of the most forthright and courageous Official Histories ever published by any country. If you haven't done so, I suggest that you read all four volumes from end-to-end, and not selectively take what suits your own hypothesises).

What most people now agree on is that with hindsight the British SBC could and should have been more effective than what it was. This is obviously different from suggesting that Britain should not have embarked upon a SBC at all. Should Britain not have done so then I would suggest that the economic cost to Britain could have been much more dire because the war might have been lost.

Cheers

Rod