[tcolvin]

Allan,
I thought this thread was finished, but it has sprung back to life.

Bill Walker's quotes from leading Germans do not support BC, and are not different from mine.

An analysis divides their reasons into four main (non-exclusive) areas;

1. Transportation got 13 votes (Galland, Jahn, Guderian, v Seidel, Veith, Wolff, v Vietinghoff, GM of Junkers Italy, Sperrle, Bodenschatz, Krupp, Dollmann, Goering)
2. Oil got 7 votes (Galland, Jahn, v Massow, Veith, v Vietinghoff, Goering, Wille)
3. Production got 6 votes, but production must include oil (Schacht, Thyssen, Wolff, Henschell, Siemens-Schukert, Steel director)
4. Unspecified strategic bombing got 7 votes. I don't know if 'strategic' includes transportation, although it must include oil (Lindemann, Kolb, v Rohden, Thomas, Kesselring, Ibel, Goering).

It is clear that the biggest number of votes for why Germany lost go to Transportation and Oil.


Both of these targets were, however, strongly rejected by BC as 'panaceas'. BC and Churchill/Lindemann were adamant that area bombing of city centres was about to end the war. BC must not be diverted to tactical bombing which had its own TAFs under Leigh Mallory.
Spaatz commanding 8 and 15 USAAFs, and not BC, chose Oil.
The AEAF and SHAEF, and not BC, chose Transportation.

Zuckerman produced an entirely convincing analysis of the effect of bombing on the Southern Italian and Sicilian railroads. Zuckerman argued that “the destruction of the railway network of W Europe should become a prime strategic target sui generis, and not just a series of targets related to Overlord” (Apes to Warlords, page 222).
Leigh-Mallory, Portal, Tedder and Eisenhower agreed with Zuckerman. But BC strongly disagreed and used one argument after another against it.

1. Harris sent a letter to Portal on January 13, 1944 listing 22 reasons why BC was not designed for, and was unsuited to doing, anything except area bombing of city centres.
2. This got everyone behind Harris' objection - the Air Ministry's Director of Bomber Operations (Bufton); the Intelligence Wing of the Ministry; the Enemy Objectives Unit of the US Economic Warfare Dept (Kindleberger, Rostow and Kayson); the Objectives Dept of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Lawrence); and Slessor in the Med.
3. Harris argued that BC at night was inaccurate and had an average error of 1,000 yards. It could not therefore do the job of bombing marshalling yards and bridges, and would kill 40,000 French civilians and wound 120,000 in making the attempt. Zuckerman showed that the calculation was fallacious and the right estimate was that 12,000 civilians might be killed and 6,000 seriously wounded. (Actual casualties were 10,000 killed and wounded).
4. The next argument was that military traffic on the railway was so small a proportion that it could not be significantly effected in any relevant period of time. The attack on railway centres would have to be continued for 12 months before the German war effort could be adversely affected. Kindleberger argued that the Germans had so many locomotives that they would be able always to get military traffic through to the front. Zuckerman pointed to the fact that in southern Italy the railroad system was paralysed even though there were plenty of locomotives.
5. Zuckerman pushed for the Transportation Plan to be generalised across the Reich. Bufton stated Harris' contrary view; 'Attacks on railway centres in the Reich will represent effort dissipated in some measure against one of the most invulnerable targets of the German economic system. The fact that the railway system is the one common denominator of the whole enemy war effort is a clear indication of its unsuitability as a vital target system in strategic attack” (Apes to Warlords page 244).
6. BC argued they could and would smash Germany through night raids on German cities, while the American Strategic Forces would do so by precise attacks on the arsenals of German air power – aircraft and aircraft component factories, and on Germany's synthetic oil plants. Not one member of the intelligence etc. staffs, nor even Tooey Spaatz, suggested prior to D-Day that the oil offensive would yield immediate results in the military field. That came later.
7. So Portal and Eisenhower decided on the Transportation Plan because they thought it the only target that could affect the Germans in the field in the first month of the invasion. On March 27, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave control of the strategic air forces to Eisenhower. But Harris and Spaatz still went on arguing, and it was not until April 17, 1944 that Eisenhower directed implementation of the Transportation Plan and Pointblank. But still nothing but Pointblank was implemented. BC raised the spectre of massive French civilian casualties which Churchill sent to FDR on May 7, 1944. FDR replied on May 11 that it was Eisenhower's decision.
8. Harris finally got the message, complied, and implemented well starting in earnest on the eve of D-Day.
9. But Harris was not convinced, and soon topped bombing railroads to concentrate on area bombing. This came to light in an analysis by Zuckerman of how the Germans managed the build-up for the Ardennes counteroffensive, which could never have happened had the Transportation Plan continued to be implemented. Harris did not speak the truth in his memoirs when he said he had always supported the Transportation Plan.
10. Zuckerman saw the light when he studied the Southern Italian and Sicilian railroad results. From then on he argued that Transportation should be the sole target for all of the Allied strategic heavy bombers. German industry would then grind to a halt without the need for bombing cities or factories, because inputs and outputs could not be moved. It seems the Germans in Bill Walker's list of quotes agreed with Zuckerman. I certainly do, but my point has always been that destroying the Achilles' heel of transportation or electrical generation and supply was a job for TAF Mosquitos, which made BC redundant. Fahey shows how much money that would have saved. Tony