Quote:
Originally Posted by Graham Boak
I have long felt that Doolittle's "freeing the fighters" rule was only possible because of the increase in the numbers of fighters available. Groups could go "freehunting" because others were available to stay with the bombers. Unescorted bomber groups suffered.
There's a similar logic in the Atlantic convoy battles. Success came to the Killer groups that went away to fight the U-boats, but they could only do that because there were enough other escorts to stay with the convoy. That and the code-breaking successes that told them where to go to find the U-boats, but I can't find an analogue to that in the air battles!
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Graham - I just wrote a much lengthier reply but the damned thing is lost in the ether.
Restated, Doolittle did not have critical mass in escorts. To prosecute his directive he needed fighters over the targets where the LW was waiting. He needed them on the deck on the way home shooting up airfields and catching the LW taking off and landing or refueling.
Unescorted bombers suffered all the way to the end even though the instances were far fewer than during the big battles of the winter/spring 1944.
What was different for Doolittle was a.) the promise of long range capability of the Mustang combined with superior performance and reliability over the P-38, b.) the mandate that the LW had to be defeated prior to D-Day no matter the cost, c.) an acknowledgment that his orders to 'destroy the LW in the air and on the ground' accompanied by his encouragement of the Fighter commanders to seek out the LW - would cost his bomber command higher casualties.
Remember that when Doolittle assumed command of the 8th AF, there were only two P-38 groups operational - to escort 30+ bomber groups over a widely dispersed target selection for every Field Order. The newly arrived 354th FG belonged to the 9th AF and the soon to arrive 357th FG also belonged to the 9th. He swapped the soon to be operational 358FG for the 357th, agreed with 9th AF to 'trade' P-47s in 8th AF to 9th in exchange for P-51s and planned the conversion of 4th, 355th and 352nd FG to the now re-allocated Mustangs and did so in last week of February through mid April.
So, Operational target escorts in January - 354FG Mustangs, 20th and 55th P-38s
February - 354 and 363rd (9AF) and 357FG (4th received in last several days of Feb) P-51s, 20th and 55th P-38s
March - 354, 357, 4th plus 355th second week P-51s, 20th, 55th and 364th (second week) P-38s
April - add the 352nd FG and remove 363rd FG.
So to escort bomber stream from western GY to furthest reach of the Reich miles to many different targets (80 mile stream for 200-400 miles)
Jan - ~ 120 escorts - effectives about 60-70% of forces dispatched
Feb - ~ 200- 220 - effectives about 70%
March ~ 320-360 - effectives about 75%
April ~ 360+
What this means is that usually there were approximately 100 escort fighters per bomb division to cover a 20+ mile bomber stream - and be prepared to meet a well executed interception by LW in stronger force.
The U-Boat/Hunter analogy only works if one group of convoy escorts take their convoy to Mid Atlantic and turn back, while the new escorst pick them up for remainder of trip and dispatch Hunter units while main escorts remain with convoy?