[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Thanks for the information.

We shouldn't push analogies too far. No, I don't think the changeover freed any escorts for hunter-killer groups. There were simply a lot more escorts available.

I agree - I was just trying to extend the 8th AF escort tactics of short range fighters (along with RAF and 9th AF P-47s) to overload Penetration and Withdrawal to your Destroyer escort analogy... and show the difficulty in contrasting the two.

A group could be detached to keep a U-boat down long enough to force it up again: an under-escorted convoy could not spare the escorts long enough. This can be seen in the number of kills awarded to the later faster later Captain class (US DEs) rather than the earlier ones, which being slower could not be spared away for as long because of the extra time they would take to catch up. Which isn't quite the same as dedicated h-k groups, but makes similar points. And doesn't read across at all....

Graham - now the analogy withers away completely. In fact if the LW overloaded the escorts then it was an all out battle with substantial LW assets breaking through and causing heavy damage.

The November 26, 1944 battle around Misburg/Hannover was a prime example of one fighter group (the 355th) cleverly 'parceling out' flights and sections to meet successive large LW gaggles from JG 2/6/301 but 40 Mustangs were not enough to deflect 200+ Fw 190s plus me 109 escorts and the 491st BG was severely punished. The 355th and 2SF shot down 26 with no losses - but the 491st lost 15 B-24s in two to three minutes, and then the 445th lost five more.

This would be equivalent to a wolfpack of 10+ subs attacking a large convoy with 4-6 escorts..in the middle of the Atlantic with no other assets to deflect the attack.

November 1944 was a great example of the LW having enough assets to overpower US escorts in alocal area causing great damage to isolated bomb groups - but paid a terrible price.