Quote:
Originally Posted by tcolvin
Graham is right that any difference between the VVS and 2TAF does not lie in the nature of their tasks. 2 TAF routinely performed CAS and interdiction on the German side of the lines.
Rather the differences in question are related to a) the responsiveness in real time to what was happening on the ground, and b) the effectiveness of that response.
From first principles the VVS should have performed better in both regards.
The VVS was an army airforce, and played an integrated role in an all-arms approach. 2TAF never subscribed to all-arms, but operated independently 'in support' and never 'under command' of 21 Army Group. The soldiers and airmen who did the fighting never met face-to-face and there was no tactical coordination between them. Graham reflects this view; "the army has many tools ......... without necessarily calling on expensive assets such as aircraft at every stumbling block". I believe that in every Russian operation, the Schwerpunkt force would have identified the PAK front and given the task of its destruction to the VVS. This never happened with 2TAF.
The VVS, unlike 2TAF, was equipped with aircraft designed for CAS; the armoured Il-2 had enhanced resistance to FLAK compared with the Typhoon and Spitfire, and the Pe-2 dive-bomber could, although the literature is silent on whether it actually did, bomb accurately in an 80 plus degree dive on enemy field positions, which was the only accurate method in WW2 for delivering high explosive.
Graham correctly states that soldiers were generally, but by no means universally, enthusiastic about seeing the German lines being pounded by the RAF; for example they stood on the parapets of their slit trenches and cheered as Bomber Command destroyed Caen. They were not informed of Zuckerman's post-operational audit which revealed no German assets were destroyed or even damaged. The army's enthusiasm was due to ignorance. The RAF might, and indeed did, state that military morale-boosting and German civilian morale-destruction was their main if not sole business, but few argue that point today.
The RAF identified their task as being to "cart bombs" to German cities and to the German front-line. The ORBs of 2TAF's fighter-bomber squadrons are replete with the word "success". By this they meant that they navigated to the target, dropped ordnance, and returned. It meant nothing more. If the StuG, PAK or MG continued to fire after being attacked by 2TAF, there was no obligation for the attack to be repeated; 2TAF had done its job, and in fact never returned to a protected target after the FLAK had been aroused.
One example must suffice. The Germans stood in February 1945 on the west bank of the Rhine. They were supplied for a month during Operation Veritable mainly over the heavily defended Rhine bridges at Wesel. The destruction of these bridges was the task of 2TAF, which they failed to perform, the bridges eventually being destroyed by the Germans after they had withdrawn on about March 10. 2TAF's lack of an effective armoured Il-2 or of a dive-bomber had serious consequences.
I suspect the VVS would never have got away with that, and they would have been ordered to return until the bridges were down. I suspect, furthermore, that the high Il-2 loss rate was due to an uncompromising insistence that the VVS perform without excuses. The RAF, on the other hand, had been traumatised in 1940 when its strategic Fairey Battle force had been 'diverted' from attacking the Ruhr to attacking the Meuse bridges with great loss. There were two consequences; the RAF refused to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft, and insisted on having the final say about whether an Army request was 'reasonable'.
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I think that the Russians probably did the best they could with the equipment and training then available. The soldiers and airmen were sometimes at the mercy of politics but that is a separate issue.
The British Air Ministry learned the hard way that adding more armor or guns sometimes overloaded the airplane and made it more vulnerable to interception (e.g. certain versions of the Buffalo, Hurricane, and Tomahawk).
On the Western Front, the Junkers 87 had a brief career because it was a deathtrap. Based on Korean war experience, I don't believe that the Il-2 Sturmovik would have fared much better.
The USAAF had Mustangs with cut-down superchargers and dive brakes (A-36) and the RAF had its Hurricane IID with 40mm gunpods. These airplanes were used on a limited basis because the advantages were outweighed by the disadvantages. After those types were retired, the standard fighters were used in the dive-bombing role all the time. Tank-busting rockets were carried in place of heavy cannons.
Today, the sound of the A-10 Warthog, AC-130 Spectre, and Apache helicopters are music to the ears of American ground troops. These dedicated Close Air Support aircraft have been very effective. But we cannot expect to use them without interference in the kind of high threat environment where enemy fighters outnumber friendly aircraft. If faced with that situation, fast jets will take over the CAS role in the same way that the Germans used Focke-Wulf 190 fighter-bombers to replace the Ju-87.