[glider1]

Before I start I must thank you for the time and effort you clearly put into the replies, its much appreciated.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Glider asked about the attacks on the Wesel bridges by BC. The task was in fact given by SHAEF to 3 Air Division of the US 8th Army Air Force. They attacked on five days with 377 sorties dropping 887 tons of bombs, as follows; 1 February (139 a/c dropped 381 tons); 14 Feb (37 a/c and 110 tons), 16 Feb (63 a/c and 189 tons); 19 Feb (68 a/c and 184 tons); and 24 Feb (70 a/c and 23 tons). They succeeded on 14 February in bringing down a span of the Wesel road bridge, leaving two bridges that survived to the end.

As I understand it then, it wasn't the failure of the 2 TAF that the bridges were not destroyed, but the responsibility of the 8th Air Force with B17/B24 to destroy the bridges. I admit to not being suprised about the difficulty. B17/B24's didn't carry big enough bombs to damage the foundations of such bridges and had to rely on a direct hit. You then have the problem of the low payload of the US bombers limiting the number of bombs carried and the normal carpet bombing approach of the USAAF depending on the lead bomber which would spread the bombs over an area the sixe of the formation.

1. Glider doubted whether any fighter bomber could hit a bridge. 2TAF normally used mediums for attacking bridges. They flew above the FLAK and were notoriously inaccurate. I believe bridges were targets for the Il-2, but certainly benefited from the accuracy of dive-bombing. It was so normal for the GAF to attack bridges that the Soviets invented a method (unique AFAIK) of underwater bridging. That the famed Norden bomb sight with the claimed ability of placing a bomb in a pickle barrel from 17,000 ft was obviously the wrong tool at Wesel was neatly demonstrated by the GAF when on 24 February they destroyed at night two American bridges over the Roer (Operation Grenade). In a post-war analysis of the Wesel bridge fiasco, the RAF concluded that Mediums should have been used, which confirms they lacked the right equipment.

I didn't doubt the ability of the FB to hit the bridge, I doubted the ability of a FB to carry a big enough bomb to damage the foundations. I didn't say it but agree with you when you say that a FB lacked the precision of a dive bomber. Unless you hit the span square on then most bombs would have a limited effect.
From what I have heard the medium bomber would have been the right weapon and in particular the 4000lb cookie in a mosquito, but these were not used. Its also truer that from what you say, the 2TAF never tried to destroy the bridges so its a bit off to say that they failed. If they had given the job to 2TAF the result might have been different as they did have the right tools.

Glider's priority in a CAS aircraft is safety from enemy fighters. This was the RAF's reasoning for not operating dive bombers (Ju-87B, Pe-2, Mustang, Vengeance), armoured bombers (Il-2, He-129B) lightly-armoured bombers (Fw 190F) or large-gun carriers (Ju-87G, He-129B-3, or even Hurricane IIE which was rejected by 2TAF). However this policy threw the baby out with the bath-water. Because on most of the occasions when aircraft with dive-bombing or big-gun accuracy, or with resistance to FLAK, were desperately needed, there was little risk of GAF fighter interception.

My statement was intended to point out that an IL2 was just as vulnerable as a Typhoon to AA fire, the Typhoon being smaller, faster and more manoeverable and more difficult to hit but more vulnerable when hit. Whereas the IL 2 could take more damage but was much easier to hit. Its only a guess but the pluses and minus' would even out. However when faced up against fighters the Typhoon had all the advantages.

As for the vulnerability of the dive bomber. You are correct when you say that the danger from fighters was low there is still the danger from AA fire. After droping their bombs dive bombers were low, slow and very vulnerable. The losses to AA fire sufferred by all the allied airforces would be magnified for dive bombers due to their low performance.

I will give just one example; the Hillman strong-point above the landing beach of La Breche held up 3 British Infantry Division all day on D-Day due to the inability of 2TAF to destroy it. The measurable consequences of Caen not being taken on D-Day, was due almost entirely, IMHO, to the absence of the Vengeance dive-bomber which could have destroyed Hillman. The Vengeances were on target-tug duties in Devon because they refused to operate dive-bombers.Tony

A couple of points on this.
1) There is no doubt that Hillman wasn't badly damaged by the landing bombardment from sea and air. But others were and some surrendered as soon as the ground forces attacked..
2) Why would an IL2 do better than a Typhoon against a heavily protected bunker system?
3) As far as I can tell Hillman wasn't attacked directly by the 2TAF once the landing was underway. With that in mind I don't see how it can be used as an example of the failure of the 2TAF.
4) Typhoons were used in support of the attack on Hillman with some success in just the role that some people believe they had little impact. You will notice the phrase 'Typhoons dive bombed Tanks as they moved up'.

Soon after four o'clock a troop of the Staffordshire Yeomanry scouting ahead reported enemy tanks advancing from Caen. The squadron with the Suffolk at Hillman strong-point was hastily moved to Biéville and had just taken up position to the west when about forty enemy tanks, moving very fast, attacked. Two were knocked out by the Yeomanry and two by the Shropshire anti-tank guns and the enemy turned away into the woods. They were pursued by the Yeomanry and by field-gun fire, and when they showed again some more were destroyed. They swung off again and were joined by others, and making a wide détour they came in towards the Périers ridge. There they met the squadron of the Staffordshire posted at Point 61 for just such an occasion. Three more were knocked out and again they drew off. Thirteen had then been knocked out to our knowledge (our only loss was one self-propelled gun), but they had already been persistently harassed by aircraft while they were south of Caen. On the western outskirts of the town eight Typhoons of the Second Tactical Air Force had dive-bombed tanks moving up to join the fight and had left two in flames and four others smoking. Feuchtinger has since said that his division started the day with 124 tanks and by nightfall had only 70 left. In view of his figures British records were over-modest

http://warchronicle.com/british_3rd_...ctorysword.htm