[tcolvin]

Glider, I now see the difficulty.

It was always 2TAF's responsibility to destroy the Wesel bridges. It was their decision to ask for Heavies rather than use their own glide-bombing Typhoons and Spitfires or Mediums. The failure of the Heavies was not the responsibility of VIIIUSAAF - they did what they could with an inaccurate weapon system, and they did it frequently and whole-heartedly. The failure to destroy the bridges remains at the door of 2TAF. The postwar audit confirmed this when 2TAF decided they should have used their own Mediums.

You think Mediums were the right tools? I beg to differ. The Medium was only a small version of a Heavy with the same inaccuracy. 2TAF's Mediums were notoriously inaccurate, destroying vast areas of housing around all of the bridges they did take down - the Dutch were particularly scathing, and Dutchmen I've spoken to said whenever they saw an Allied medium they'd dive for cover. I guess you know that Horrocks, OC XXX Corps, banned the Mediums after they had twice bombed his troops in Operation Veritable.

The problem of the Typhoon was its vulnerable engine. The great Eric Roberts, CO 609 Squadron, was brought down by a solitary MG42 on the barge he was attacking on March 9, 1945. He had been given the OK to attack the barge by Johnny Baldwin, who was present, ironically because there was no FLAK; defended targets had been placed out of bounds in order to cut down the pilot loss rate. The only possible conclusion is that the Typhoon was not fit for purpose. It can be said with a certainty that no Il-2 could not be brought down by an MG42.

There was no FLAK at Hillman. But even if there had been, a non-frivolous 2TAF under Army control, would have devised a drill for neutralising FLAK before sending in the Vengeance dive-bombers. These were, in any case, less vulnerable than Typhoons to FLAK.

The question to be answered is why 2TAF chose the Typhoon and Spitfire for CAS. I suggest the reasons were both psychological and philosophical. The psychological problem resulted from the trauma of 1939/40 when the cream of the strategic bomber crews were killed in daylight when flying Wellingtons in the Heligoland Bight and Battles against the Meuse bridges. They said never again, and took to the night. When they had to destroy the Wesel bridges, they passed the parcel to the Heavies. The RAF's philosophical problem was due to the teaching of Trenchard that air power was unique in that it could succeed without needing to engage the enemy's main force. Instead it would attack the enemy's means of production. When ordered to accompany the Army or be broken up, the RAF, like the tanks, grasped at the panacea of mobility; a 400mph Typhoon would survive where a 250mph Battle could not (a 30mph cruiser tank would survive where a 12mph Infantry tank could not). When the Typhoon loss rate from FLAK reached an unacceptable level, 2TAF simply withdrew the Typhoon and Spitfire from defended targets.

Concerning the Typhoon's claims against 21 Panzer Division on D-Day, I would question that Typhoons dive-bombed (sic) tanks and left two in flames and four others smoking. Such claims (eg around Mortain in July), when investigated by Operational Research teams, were almost always reduced and the destruction ascribed to anti-tank guns.

Tony