[tcolvin]

Glider you are right, but surely unreasonable, when you state I have 'assumed' reduction in 2TAF support was due to losses, without proof.
The ORB states the reduction was in the, "liberal use of aircraft in support rôles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots."
I cannot see how the shortage of aircraft could have been due to anything except heavy losses. Shortage of spares? servicing capacity? - I don't think so.
And surely a reading of the memoir literature explains that the "weariness" of the pilots was a euphemism for shattered morale due to FLAK.
Pilots reported being physically sick when being briefed for ops, and of inability to sleep, from fear of FLAK.
Incapacitating fear was the inevitable result of flying unarmoured aircraft vulnerable even to rifle fire, and the reason why pilots never went round again after missing the target - something the VVS, AFAIK, would not countenance.

Secondly I think you are wrong about the Wesel bridges. The RAF destroyed every one of the Seine bridges, and many many more all over Western Europe that were not strongly defended. They knew, as the VVS and GAF knew, how to destroy bridges - that was not the problem. The problem with the Wesel Bridges was that they were very, very strongly defended, like the Meuse bridges in 1940. For this reason 2TAF asked SHAEF for USAAF Heavies to undertake the task in daylight on their behalf, since Heavies could fly above the FLAK and plaster the site with Nordensight-accuracy, and they succeeded in bringing down one span. As far as the Heavies were concerned, the lack of GAF defence and the lack of very heavy immobile FLAK (like the twin 128mm FLAK equipment defending Hamburg, Berlin and Vienna) meant the Wesel Bridges were in effect undefended.

Tony