[Bill Walker]

And what was the net result of destroying this bridge? Germany was defeated maybe a day or two later?

This story reminds me very much of some recent reading on the German night fighter force. It glorified and catered to a small number of highly skilled and successful pilots, giving them individual aircraft modifications, first choice of interception areas, etc. The end result was some very impressive statistics for the individual pilots, but not for the night fighter force as a whole. This kind of approach had some benefit in the very short campaigns the Germans fought early in the war, but was self-defeating in the protracted struggle that the war became. In the end this handful of highly capable individuals was overwhelmed by masses of average aircrew (no disrespect meant) flying masses of average aircraft. I think this is part of of what Six Nifty 50s was referring to in his mention of a "cost/benefit analysis". Given the choice of developing highly skilled individuals (and aircraft to suit them) or producing masses of average aircrew in average aircraft, the Allies made one choice, and the Germans made another. History tells us who was correct.

It is obvious that the Allies quickly realized that this was to be a long war, and adopted training and equipment philosophies to suit this. The Germans realized this too late, if at all. In my opinion, looking at this underlying difference in philosophies does far more to explain differences in equipment fielded and tactics used by the two air forces than talking about "Tribalism" amongst senior officers.