[Mark E Horan]

The numbers you are quoting are theoretical ranges of new aircraft with new engines flown by top (i.e. test) pilots flying in excellent weather off a land-base without the need to follow combat doctrines under combat conditions. Another words, they don't apply in reality. Speaking of 1942 specifically:

1. Aircraft range was unimportant. The critical range was the squadron's range - which was that of the most wasteful plane in the formation. This was invariably the tail-end plane(s).

2. Squadron aircraft were not equal. Senior pilots received the newer, better maintained planes. Those same pilots, as leaders, flew the squadron and division guides. In theory they had considerably more experience in maximizing engine performance for fuel economy and thus used far less fuel..

3. The aircraft ran their engines up under power to fully warm them up and then they remained under idle power for unplanned periods because of problems on other aircraft during launch.

4. Squadrons departed in reverse order. Thus, the inexperienced junior pilots took off first. Their aircraft were older planes with more tired engines. They had less experience maximizing performance for fuel economy. They orbited more forming up. They had to jockey in formation on their leaders throughout the flight.

5. The squadrons landed in formation order, lead planes first. Thus the planes in the worst position in regards to fuel needed to remain in the air longer. These same pilots, more likely to be more wasteful of fuel due to less training were also more likely to be less accurate in their navigation were they to unable to form on a division leader during withdrawal, (wasting more fuel) needed to orbit the ship for far longer before landing.

6. The planes were much more likely to operate at full power during the high-speed approach, attack, and subsequent withdrawal for periods longer than prewar estimates. Also, if the ship needed to steam away from the enemy during launch and recovery an additional additional fuel (up to 50 miles worth) would be required for the distance covered during launch and recovery.

7. Prewar figures available for the TBD, SBD-2/-3 and F4F-3/3A/-4 available to the fleet did not include the combat equipment (dual .30 free guns, and extra weight for armour and self-sealing tanks).

8. Allotment needed to be made for the distinct possibility of weather related issues and a large reserve was needed for navigational issues, the chance that damage to the ship would require further flight time, crashes might halt flight operations during recovery, and the ship might not maintain its option course.

9. At ranges beyond 200 miles the navigation issues of finding the target and getting back home were much more serious. Homing becons were new and most pilots did not understand how they worked and thus were disinclined to rely on them.

10. The Pacific Fleet carriers through Midway were still developing wartime doctrinal modifications. Lexington SBDs carrying 1,000 pound bombs still followed the pre-war book requirement that they drop off 22 gallons of fuel. Both the Enterprise and Yorktown Air Groups rejected this doctrine from the first raids on. None the less, all three carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, Yorktown) adopted the same general guidelines in regards to range:

TBD: 200 miles with torpedo and two crew
SBD: 200 miles with 1,000 pound bomb
SBD: 275 miles with 500 pound bomb
F4F: 175 miles

By 1944 the SBD-5s were going 325 miles with more power, more fuel, more pilot training on fuel economy, and doctrinal changes that emphasized economical formation flying, including not climbing to 20+ K feet.

Thus, the limiting factor was the range of the fighter escort, NOT the TBDs.

That said, the navigational problem of departing a moving base to locate a moving target and then return to a moving base was daunting enough that at ranges beyond 200 miles prewar and early war experience showed that the chance of not locating enemy warships was significant enough that it was not worth launching at those ranges if the target was not a stationary enemy base.

Additionally, it is worth noting that every single Enterprise SBD and TBD that returned to the ship from the morning launch on 4 June was in the air from 5.2 to 5.5 hours - considerably longer than the book values for either plane's endurance - and no plane came aboard with more than 10 gallons of usable fuel remaining. The pilots did this by adjusting their engine settings for maximum fuel economy from immediately after takeoff without regards to minimum "book" settings, accepting possible engine wear as a by product of getting home safely.

So, based on extensive interviews with the pilots doing the flying, those book figures were worthless under combat conditions. They were just as worthless in 1944.

Hope this is of interest.

Mark E. Horan