Of course attrition of 1941 was a factor, but it is also clear that it did not strain the Jagdwaffe. They pretty much had the situation under control, or at worst simply avoided combat. RAF Fighter Command did not strain the german system...
If we mention Fighter Command in 1941/42, then we might as well say that attrition started with the Battle of France in 1940, which meant that the Luftwaffe could only replace their losses for the upcoming Battle of Britain, instead of building up their strength. The same happened again against the Soviet Union, the Luftwaffe having mainly replaced their Battle of Britain losses.
And if there is one steady attritional factor that's overlooked its the Eastern Front meat grinder, which from the start took a steady toll (the opening round always shocks me, although the gains were great during Barbarossa, so were the losses - leaving the Luftwaffe more or less punch drunk in the winter of 1941/42).
However when we discuss the Mustang we automatically focus on the Battle over Germany proper, when the Jagdwaffe could not avoid confrontation, but had to fight at any cost and when the german system was really put to the limit and over it...
Although
serious historians will probably shudder at the thought of these childish type vs type discussions, howver I still persist that while the Thunderbolt did the real work (or as some might say, lay the foundation), the Mustang took the credits.
Too much credit is given to some of the advantages of the Mustang, apart from the economics of being able to buy two of them for the price of one competitor (would be interesting to compare manhours, which unlike the money is a real a factor in war economy).
Speed is relative, certainly when applying hit and run tactics. Also it is arguable which a/c proofed to be the superior weapons platform in the most common attack form - a high speed bounce.
But this discussion is practically meaningless
without supporting figures, just a nice bar room conversation
