[Ruy Horta]

First the range is a matter of temporary advantage, the Thunderbolt was playing catch up with the Mustang (the Lightning was already in the same ballpark or very near).

I don't doubt that the Mustang's record will look impressive, but if you take into account that during Big Week the Thunderbolt was still the most numerous US fighter type, I'd feel comfortable in adding that by the spring of 1944 the air war in the west had run its course. Sure, more pilots would die, more a/c would be built, but the matter had been decided before the impact of the Mustang could be felt.

Now I'd risk another statement. The loser loves to blame a wonder weapon. During the Battle of Britain it was the Spitfire, during the RVT it became the Mustang. Its easier to blame technology, since the Mustang was a world beater, all other considerations being secondary. The failure is aleviated by having to face (supposedly) superior technology.

Galland especially with his infamous Spitfire quote is the epitomy of this thought (taken out of context or not). If only we had something like a Spitfire, the Bf 109F was a retrogressive step, the Mustang was a wunderwaffe, Hitler messed up the Me 262 program...

So my main points are:
1. The main battle had been waged before the Mustang made its presence felt.
2. The Thunderbolt (and Lightning) could have done the same job if required, it might have taken a little longer that's all.

Of course this discussion becomes a bit of a generalization for the sake of focus and clearity. 1944 confuses the picture because of stepped up fighter production and en equally stepped up training program, yet the pilots manning these fighters do not have the same quality as only a year before, in essence the Luftwaffe is training cannon fodder, nothing more and nothing less...the Mustang had its place in history as it could pick the fruit of earlier labor.

So in the war over Germany, how much of a turning point is Big Week?

(sorry, I am leaving out RAF Bomber Command's strategic offensive completely).