[Alan Clark]

I think this extract from the No.11 SFTS ORB should answer your question. It was in under the 12th December 1940 but clearly refers to the incident being November.

11.12 Court of Inquiry into the Circumstances in which, on November 3rd 1940 an attack was made on Wellington
aircraft I.C. L.7817 of No.300 Sqdn by Hurricane Aircraft of No.11 SFTS piloted by S/Leader P.H. Maxwell, C.F.I.
and make recommendations as to the action to be taken. The Court was convened by order of A.O.C. No.21 Group
and was composed of W/Cdr E.W. Simpson, No.21 Group (President), S/Ldr F.V. Gauntlett, RAF Stn Cranage and
F/Lt P.G. Lamb of No.10 SFTS (Members). The following is a summary of the proceedings which are referred to in
11SFTS files as 941/59/P1. S/Ldr Maxwell states: “I am C.F.I. at No.11 SFTS. I was also in charge until the 20th
November of the Station Fighter Defence Flight…… On Sunday 3.11.40 about 1200 hrs I received a phone message
from the Observer Corps at Shrewsbury that a Wellington had entered our area from Wrexham area. Prior to the date
mentioned I had received reports of suspicious Wellington over Shawbury aerodrome, on one particular occasion the
25.10.40 Wellington F-QV had been challenged by a pilot of No.27 M.U. and had taken no notice. The 27 MU pilot
challenged it by firing across its bows. The fact was reported to W/Cdr Green our Security Officer and S. Eng. O. who
made efforts to ascertain particulars of this a/c – the reply from Bomber Command after an interval (29.10.40) was
negative. In consequence I consulted the Sec. Offr and it was decided that in the event of repetitions regarding
Wellingtons or Whitleys we should challenge them. Accordingly when I received the message on 3.11.40 I considered
it was advisable to take off in a Hurricane to intercept. I made no interception and returned. I contacted the Obs. Corps
who said it had turned east and circuited Ternhill and was proceeding towards Crewe and then coming once more in
our direction. It was at this moment I observed a Wellington approaching from the N.W. I subsequently intercepted
this Wellington at Sutton Coldfield at about 1220. It was then making gentle turns from left to right and appeared in
no great hurry – suddenly it took up a straight course and appeared to put on speed. This induced me to believe that
the pilot had noticed me which was directly from behind and 1500 ft above him. I was then flying at about 5,000ft. It
was some time before I caught up with him. My position was then approx 8 miles N.E. of Birmingham aerodrome at
Elmdon. I estimated his speed 240 mph (indicated). When I had caught up I lost height and flew level within 100 yds
[of] him. I now noticed there were no Squadron Markings. I then flew in front and above and dived past several times
expecting him either to slow down and drop his wheels or to fire the colour of the day. He took neither of these
precautions but just continued on course and speed. I then fired a burst across his nose. Having used one in five tracer
he could not possibly have failed to notice. I repeated the burst. He ignored it. I now decided to bring him down if
possible. I opened fire from the beam to starboard and then to port. He still continued. I then attacked from the rear
turning and attacking from ahead to beam. By this time my ammunition was expended and we entered thick weather
over Leicester, our height was then about 1500 ft. I lost him and returned to Shawbury and reported to my C.O. and
the Air Ministry. In afternoon I contacted Obs Corps who said the Wellington was last plotted over Lincolnshire.”
Questioned; “What other means of challenging the pilot are there other than firing across his nose?” Answer: “None, It
was up to him to comply with No.SD 158(i)para 6. Onus was on him to prove friendly character.” Question by P/O
Lewis (pilot of Wellington): “Did you notice my u/c was partially down after your first attack?” S/Ldr Maxwell:
“No!” He put no further questions to S/L Maxwell.
P/O W.E.J. Lewis No.9 S.F.P. Pool, Hawarden stated: “I am a ferry pilot attached to the HQs S.F.P. Pools RAF Stn
Kemble attached to Hawarden. On Nov 3rd 1940 I was detailed by F/Lt Bentley, M.C., A.F.C., commanding No.9
S.F.P.P. to collect from 48 M.U. at Hawarden Wellington No.L7817 and deliver to No.300 (Polish) Sqdn Swinderby,
Lincs. I took off at 1200 hrs and proceeded on an easterly course intending to cross the Pennines, but in the region of
Hulme-Walfield I encountered mist and further toward the hills I found cloud covering the hilltops. I then decided to
alter course and follow the railway via Leek to Uttoxeter and therefore go round via the lower ground. I was
temporarily lost circling around finally ‘pin pointing’ myself in the region of the hills to the West of Hanbury – I then
followed the river Trent eastwards. My height was approx 4,000 ft and I gradually lost height in order the [to] more
clearly to follow the river as the visibility was very poor with a ground fog – in the area of Donington Hall I was at
approx 1,000 ft and turned toward Newark-on-Trent. At this point I saw a Hurricane cross above me to the left and
appeared to sideslip across to the right and turn to the left behind me. I waved my map at him in the cabin as I have
often had aircraft formatting upon me when ferrying twin engined aircraft. I thought that he was just having a look at
me and would go away as often happens because he disappeared behind me and I dismissed the incident from my
mind and continued Map reading. Approx 30 seconds later I heard an unusual sound, and looking up I saw tracer
bullets passing over and to the left of the cabin which were being fired from my port quarter – I immediately put both
airscrews into fine pitch and lowered my u/c at the same time reducing height – a further attack was made from the
starboard quarter and a third from dead astern – By this time I was at 300 feet in the West Bridgeford area and in mil
forward visibility I turned 90o to the right and eventually found Nottingham aerodrome intending to make a landing. I
noticed my u/c indicator green lights were not on and observed that my u/c was only half down. I therefore tried the
emergency u/c operating lever and found that the wheels were coming down and the light go green. My flaps were not
working. I eventually landed at Swinderby at 1300 hrs and handed the Wellington over to the consignee. In landing
without flaps the tail wheel apparently snapped off and the rear turret was further damaged by dragging along
aerodrome surface. Questions by Court: “Are you familiar with instructions of Recognition of Aircraft as laid down in
SD 158(i)?” Answer; “I have not sent the publication mentioned but I am familiar with the ordinary means of
Recognition and identification – namely the immediate lowering of the u/s to establish friendly identity, flashing a
series of dots with an Aldis Lamp on the leading fighter – the firing of the colours of the day and signalling the reply
letter for the period on the upward or downward morse key.” Had you an Aldis Lamp in the aircraft? Answer: I had no
Aldis Lamp at hand for use. – Had you any means of firing the colours of the day? I knew the colours of the day but
the Verey pistol is fixed in the roof of the Wireless Operator’s cabin behind the pilot’s seat and I could not get at it. –
Could you signal the reply letter for the period? Yes, but I cannot remember it now – I got them from the Duty Pilot
before leaving Hawarden. – Why didn’t you land when first attacked? I could not land at the moment because I was
over a populated area, but I intended to land at Nottingham Aerodrome had I not noticed the attacker had gone. – Can
you fire a Verey Pistol from the Pilot’s seat? Yes, I could fire it from the sliding window at my left shoulder. –
Question by S/L Maxwell: Had you the cartridge of the day with you? As I did not have the Verey Pistol removed
from the Wireless Cabin I did not take cartridges with me. – Were you aware that I had flown with 100 yards both
parallel, above and below as well as diving across your nose from port to starboard and reverse before challenging you
with two subsequent challenges of tracer across? No, because I had no observer with me and the only time I saw you
was above and in front of me to the left – you sideslipped across in front of me to the right and sideslipped to the left
and behind me – I would like to point out that I was Map reading otherwise I have no doubt I would have seen you as
you state.”
FINDINGS: Having considered the evidence the Court make the following Findings:-
(I) We consider that S/L Maxwell was justified in taking the air in a Hurricane for the purpose of identifying the
aircraft.
(II) We are of the opinion that S/L Maxwell took every possible means of challenging the Wellington but we consider
that he should have made some further efforts to ascertain if the pilot was friendly either by following the a/c to find
out whether it was going to land in this country or waiting until it approached the coast before opening fire. S/L
Maxwell might have concluded that the a/c was being ferried either to an M.U. or a Sqdn as it had not Sqdn markings.
(III) We also think that P/O Lewis should have had a Verey Pistol with cartridges immediately available to enable him
to give the recognised colours of the day and that he was negligent in failing to provide himself with this equipment.
(IV) We are satisfied that P/O Lewis made an effort to give the recognised method of showing his friendly character
by dropping his u/c but that owing to partial failure of the mechanism the u/c was not fully lowered and consequently
not visible to the S/L.
RECOMMENDATION OF COURT:- (I) When aircraft are being tested by the manufacturers or M.U. or being ferried
from these to Sqdns they should have some distinguishing mark for identification purposes.
(II) That all Ferry Pilots are fully acquainted with the procedure laid down for recognition of identification of friendly
aircraft in SD 158(i) and supplied with the necessary means of complying with these regulations.
(III) That security flights at non-operational RAF Stns in area covered by Fighter Sqdns are no longer necessary.
(IV) It is observed that there is no recognised method for a Pilot to indicate to the pilot of another aircraft that the
letter is being challenged before opening fire, and it is recommended that some method should be adopted.”