Quote:
Originally Posted by Jens
I would also support the oppinion, that introduction of P-51 wasn't that decisive, since many german planes were shot down by P-47. This includes great bundle of Experten like Rall.
But i don't think that 8th AF had a chance only with bombers. Losses in Schweinfurt where much higherthan 60 due damages. If Luftwaffe had used 1944 equipment and tactics like Mk-108 and Sturmgruppen with long-range fighter escort, the losses of four-engined bomber would be much to high.
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I would disagree. Within a very short time from first combat ops in December 1943, through May 1944 the limited strength of P-51s destroyed more German aircraft in the air than all the P-47 credits for all the 8th and 9th AF Thundebolts for all the combat sorties of P-47s in the ETO.
As to P-47s shooting down experten like Rall - true. Rall ventured into the range of P-47s on May 12 and was shot down after he cornered Hub Zemke and nearly shot him down - around Frankfurt - just inside P-47 range. Note all the experten (and experienced fighter pilots) shot down from Frankfurt to Posnan and Brux and Schweinfurt by Mustangs as well as eliminating the Me 110 and Me 410 from truly effective sorties against bombers. The initial value of the Mustang is that it killed a LOT of LW experienced fighter pilots based in LF Reich which were pulled in from Ost and Sud fronts as reinforcement against 8th AF campaing against strategic targets.
Note also that most of the air to air Jug kills in the west during 1943 were primarily Luftflotte 3 with JG2 and JG26 as well as western Germany based units of Mitte and then Reich. They weren't touching German pilots based in Central, Eastern and Southern Germany and particularly after the LW adopted the tactics of waiting to hit the bombers after they were out of P-47 escort range.
In fact, the P-51B IMO completely neutralized the LW ability to a.) effectively resist 8th AF incursions anywhere in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and b.) contest air superiority over Normandy, and c.) regroup/re-train and re-deply more experienced fighter pilots.
The numbers for
ETO/USAAF ONLY 1942-May, 1945 - 8th and 9th AF
Spitfire 15.0
P38 452.0
P-47 2,658.4
P-51 4,179.2
P-61 128.0
The 'crossover' point for the transisition from P-47 to P-51 as dominant ETO fighter occurred from Big Week to Big B, February 20, 1944 through March 8, 1944.
Between Feb 20 and Feb 29 the Jug (all 8th and 9th AF P-47s combined) outscored the Mustang 140 to 64.5. From March 1 through March 8 the Mustangs (4 FG's, one with two days experience (355th), two with one and three weeks experience (357/4th) and one with three months (354FG) - outscored all 11 P-47 Groups (56, 78, 352, 353, 355(six days), 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 365) - 108 to 86.
By the end of March the tally for P-51s during March was 254 to 176 for the Jugs. April was 322 to 85 - Mustang over P-47.
This does not include aircraft destroyed on the Ground by the P-51 in that period. From January through May the P-51 destroyed. count was 529 to 164.5 for the Jug.
All in - 8th and 9th AF combined Jan 1 through May 31 leading up to control of the air over Normandy beaches
P-47 Destroyed 764.5 air and 164.5 ground. The P-51 destroyed 1142.3 air and 529 ground.
As to the thread - I do believe Daylight Strategic bombing was on a very short leash until the decision was made that the number one objective for the 8th and 9th AF was to eliminate LW resistance over the Normandy campaign - and even then the initiation of re-targeting deep strategic targets didn't occur until two P-38 and one P-51 Group was operational in January 1944.