[ATCCbengt]

Hi all.

Allthough this tread has been dormant for some time, here is the explanation of what went wrong with the attacks on these dams. From AIR 24/206 (Bomber Command ORB – Operations Branch January 1944 – May 1945).

During the period October – December, 1944, serious consideration was being given to the destruction of two RUHR River Dams (URFT and SCHWAMMENAUEL) in support of the Army advance on RHINE. Both Dams were belived to have been mined by the Germans with a view to their destruction at such time as might be tactically suited to the German Forces operating to the West of those Dams. The project was first passed to this Command on the 25th October, 1944, for information only. All available target material and the latest P.R.U. photographs were collected, however, and passed to No. 5 Group for study. On the 6th November, 1944, further details of the Dams were recived from Bomber Command Advanced confirming that 9th Air Force had been informed by S.H.A.E.F. that the water in the Dams was too low to admit of successful attacks and that they would not be attacked by this Command unless changed conditions warranted it. On the 29th November, 1944, a request was recived from S.H.A.E.F. through Bomber Command Advanced for an attack on the RUHR Dams as soon as the weather permitted. The decision as to which or both of the Dams would be attacked rested with this Command. Replying by signal on the 30th November, 1944, this Headquarter stated that the position of the front line troops prohibited a blind attack by G-H, but that a visual attack on both Dams would be undertaken by the first opportunity. A new bomb line was recived from the 9th Air Force on the same date, however, and it was found that the troops were further away from the target than had been thought and a blinf G-H attack by No. 3 Group was therefore planned for the 1st December, 1944. This attack was cancelled owing to weather conditions at 0730 hours on that date. The two Dams at that time under consideration were the URFT (No. 1 Dam) and the SCHWAMMENAUEL (No. 2 Dam). Between the 1st and 10th December, 1944, no less than 13 operations were laid on against these Dams involving a total of 1656 aircraft, 1476 aircraft on the URFT and 180 aircraft on the SCHWAMMENAUEL Dam. Of this total, 800 aircraft were cancelled before take-off; 856 were cancelled or went to the target and brought back their bombs pwing to adverse weather conditions. Only 152 aircraft dropped their bombs.
The plan of attack against both Dams was a low level attack first with samll bombs to peel off the air face of the Dam, followed by a low level TALLBOY attack also against their face. At that time, it was considered that an attack on No. 2 Dam (SCHWAMMENAUEL) was unlikely to be very effective owing to the low level of the water. Following the unsuccessful attemptss indicated above, consideration was given to an attack against the URFT Dam using the UPKEEP weapon, but for various reasons this was not considered practicable. At Encl. 67A is a personal signal from the C-in-C to A.V.M Orland at Bomber Command Advanced which states that it was apparent that the URFT Dam could not be broken by bombing and that there was not sufficient soace to allow for the use of UPKEEP. It was hoped, however, by bombing the spillway to break the lip and masonery floor with the object of using the overflow to erode the hillside. The C-in-C pointed out that this would only be practicable if the hill was composed of earth and boulders and not rock. He considered that if the operation was successful, it would be possible to lower the water level in the Dam to below the point where it remainded a threat. Provided the enemy did not become aware of the intention and use sluices, he hoped that the released water might fill the bottom Dam (SCHWAMMENAUEL) sufficiently to make it vulnerable to bombing. He therefor started his intention of continuing to attack the URFT Dam until the trial had proved that the hillside was solid rock and would not erode. He pointed out that should the enemy use the sluices to keep the water below damage level, there was no hope of success. Between the 11th and the 13th December, 1944, three further attacks were laid on, but two were cancelled owing to weather and of the 684 aircraft detailed for the 11th December, 1944, only 183 attacked. At the Air Commander’s Conference at S.H.A.E.F. on 15th December, 1944, the Deputy Supreme Commander requested that no further attacks be made on the Dam.


All the best,
Bengt