[drgondog]

I have had the opportunity to discuss the effect of free-ranging fighters behind German lines with more than a few knowledgable gentlemen on the other side.

Without going to the trouble of extracting General Galland's exact quotes which are in my book, paraphrased they go like this:
1. The effect of particularly the Mustang from March 1944 in dropping to the deck on the way home, strafing airfields, trains, barges and road traffic was devastating to the Luftwaffe - often preventing orderly take off and assembly to meet daylight bomber attacks and often wreaking havoc on tired pilots attempting to land often damaged a/c. Galland was very strong on this factor preventing him from getting large concentrations of fighters often enough in a localized space where he would have significant superiority and be able to do great damage.

2. The shooting up of trains and road and barge traffic had a more sinister effect to Germany's successful de-centralizing industry, particularly aircraft. The achilles heel was bringing sub assemblies by surface traffic which often came under attack somewhat offset the difficulties the Heavy bombers had in dealing with much de-centralization by not being able to destroy several large concentrations. In addition many repairable and repaired fighters returning from maintenance facilities via flatbed trucks were once again damaged or destroyed in such attacks

The above comments were made specifically to my question "How did the very large tactical "Footprint" of the Mustang cause difficulties to the Luftwaffe after Doolittle encouraged 8th AF Fighter Command to go on the offensive".

Remember, these attacks were ranging from Munich to Berlin months before the invasion.

Independent on whether the low level strafing attacks did as much damage as claimed, the order of magnitude of 5,000 German a/c destroyed on the ground matched the number destroyed in the air by the Mustang - and we haven't even touched on the terrible damage inflicted by the Typhoons and Thunderbolts in close proximity to the front lines in the true Fighter Bomber role.

The Falaise Pocket certainly illustrated the terrible effect of such low level attacks by the 'Jabo's'.... and the psychological effects of having to plan logistics and movement of critical supplies only at night reduced much of the German Army's effectiveness at the point of attack.