[tcolvin]

Going for the boat now. Alex: Slessor said that 100 maximum would close the gap, and probably fewer would have sufficed. Perhaps 86 was that number. If the RAF had been more insistent, perhaps the USAAF might have been shamed into giving them more - they were after all an RAF order. But the B24 was not suitable for night bombing, so the RAF's interest was minimal. Bill: the heavy losses of submarines in the Bay of Biscay due to the RAF wa a temporary aberration by the Kriegsmarine deciding to stay on the surface and fight it out in the Bay. When they stopped that suicidal course of action, sub losses fell away significantly. The effect of an aircraft overhead a convoy was extraordinary. U-boats seen in the distance manoeuvering disappeared and the RAF was cheered to the gunwales. A U-boat on the surface made 17 knots, while one submerged was lucky to make 3 knots and only for a short period. Their effectiveness disappeared when aircraft were about. The RN were at fault for not putting escort carriers on until 1943 and messing about with flying Swordfish off grain carriers, but the single most effective means of neutering the Wolf packs was the B24, and that could have been done in 1942. I'm not sure what your beef is, apart from a need to justify the RAF's tunnel vision. Of course there were many aspects to the complete destruction of Doenitz' fleet: HuffDuff, Enigma, Escort carriers, and the B24! Tony