[Josh Osborne]

There are a number of operational research reports available which attempt to avaluate the actual effects of jabo attacks. One report in particular evaluates the damage inflicted in the battles around Mortain and Falaise. Another similar study was performed after the battle of the Ardennes. All reports showed similar results, namely:
1) Strafing, rocket, and bomb attacks were very effective against unarmored and lightly armored transport.
2) Bomb and rocket attacks were notably ineffective against heavy AFVs. (Note: Tony Williams website has excellent information regarding 40's era anti-tank aircraft weapons)

The vulnerability of motor and horse-drawn transport had several consequences:
1) Movement was restricted during the day
2) Time and effort had to be expended hiding and camoflaging vehicles
3) Traffic that had to move during daylight would see losses, especially ammunition and fuel transport that were particularly vulnerable
4) Destroyed vehicles caused traffic pile-ups, which made the remaining vehicles that much more vulnerable to air and artillery attack

In addition to the effectiveness against soft-skinned transport, jabos were also effective against command and control centers and bridges.

My references for the above information: "To Win the Winter Sky" by Danny S Parker, Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront'.

To say that jabos were ineffective to the overall war effort because they cannot destroy tanks is a ridiculous statement. Was the M-1 rifle a useless weapon because it could not destroy tanks? If you can damage or delay the train that carries the tank, then the tank gets to the battle too late. If there is no gas or ammo for the tank, it is a useless pile of metal.