Hello all,
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Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken
II.) Do you know which Fliegerkorps they sorted under at the time - I am still looking...
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During the 1st half of April it was IV.Fliegerkorps, the rest of the timeframe in question - I.Fliegerkorps except 29.Apr.-7.May.43 - thereat Stab StG2 was in Charkow-Nord (VIII.Fliegerkorps area), don’t know whether it was a temporarily attachment or short-living full subordination.
What is your source about the units’ subordination to the Fliegerkorps?
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Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken
The unit was moved to Kertsch in April 1943. How was the communication from the operational area to the command structure? Are disturbances in the communication by paper likely?
Was there any heavy fighting going on in the area at the time? My answer is yes - they had their work definitely cut out for them - I think you and others can add more detail than me with regards to this.
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StG2 on 1.Apr.43 has made a big raid against Batajsk railway junction, then some activity on the Miusfront and off Isjum (IV.Fliegerkorps area). Bad weather has hampered the air actions in the first half of April. In the middle of April StG2 have relocated to Kertsch for the operation 'Neptun' against the bridgehead S of Noworossijsk. Then up to the end of timeframe in question StG2 has operated on Kuban except the short time between 28/30.Apr. and 4/14.May (time was different for the Groups) then the base was Charkow (VIII.Fliegerkorps area).
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Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken
… something special happens at the end of March - up until then (I think it will probably coincide with the move of the Geschwader from Stalino to Kertsch) …
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If to be a frank, I can’t find any special. The frontline on the whole Ostfront was surprisingly stable during the Apr.-Jun.43. Territorial changes has measured in several kilometers in the few places. There were no chaotic retreats, encirclements, sudden losses of airbases etc. StG2 was active during the timeframe but it was active during the previous and following months too. Kertsch wasn’t an improvised air base, had the normal network. So the problems with the loss reports, if they were, had the internal nature probably.
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Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken
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It was over Batajsk during the raid against that key railway junction. Hope to find the Russian evidences about that midair collision.
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Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken
And here comes my theory - the losses for I./St.G.2 between the dates of April 27th 1943 and May 26th 1943 - where there in theory should have been 12 losses reported are missing at central level due to one or more of the above mentioned factors.
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The problem is in the point that we can find only few additional losses/damages in KTB StG2 during the May-June 1943. It maybe:
28.May.43 (II./StG2, forced landing on the German side due to AAA damage) [2 Ju87 in KTB, but 1 of them mentioned in GQM returns]
2.Jun.43 (II./StG2, forced landing normally on the German side due to AAA damage) [3 Ju87 in KTB, but 2 of them mentioned in GQM returns]
8.Jun.43 (I./StG2, forced landing normally on the German side for unspecified reason)
9.Jun.43 (II./StG2, forced landing normally on the German side due to AAA damage)
12.Jun.43 (III./StG2, forced landing normally on the German side due to AAA damage)
And maybe some others. But their % of damages unknown and maybe less than 10% in all or some cases.
Also, if the hypothetic bags with loss records were lost en route to Berlin due to railroad sabotage of Ju52 crashes as you wrote, it was a random sample and probably contains all degrees of losses from 10% to 100% partly with personal losses. So some of them should be find in the NVM records. But Matti wrote that can’t add any personal loss to GQM returns in this case.
Also, as I wrote above, almost all losses of Luftflotte 4 in Apr.-Jun.43 that became really known to Russians in 1943 can be found in the GQM returns except few uncertain cases. I can’t find yet any additional loss from StG2 in the Kuban area for the timeframe in question though I use a huge amount of various documents from the POW’s interrogation reports up to the technical command which has evacuated crashed and damaged planes. Continue to hope but…
So hypothesis that the reason of the difference between Bewegungsmeldungen and GQM returns was the losses of the some reports seems doubtful.
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Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken
So no mystery - no propaganda - just war...
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I don’t think about German propaganda in this case. Dr. Goebbels haven’t needed internal Luftwaffe papers for his propagandist masterpieces.
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Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken
I believe Andrey - that if we look into the existing records still remaining on the Luftwaffe side - and try to correlate information from the other combatants with the same open mind - we will be able to bring the research forward - the other approach which I have seen far too much of is to dismiss information just because it does not fit some kind of hero story from one side or the other...
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'Hero stories' isn't the point. The point is that 60+ % difference in the losses is a significant factor for the analysis of the operations.
About 4.(F)/Nacht and 2.(F)/100 - a bit later.
Best regards,
Andrey