[bearoutwest]

Here’s a quick (“Reader’s Digest style) snap-shot summary of the pre-1941 air war over China.

In 1937, IJA operations centred round the North of China, crossing over from Manchuria towards Beijing in early July. IJN centred their operations around Shanghai in August 1937. The bulk of the better-trained pre-war Chinese aircrews were stationed in the south to defend the major centres (Shanghai, Guangzhou/Canton, and the then-capital Nanking). It was also Chinese government philosophy to fight the battle where western reporters could see the effect (and encourage more sympathy). Hence the major defence of Shanghai – especially directly across the river from the International Settlement. Almost all of the pre-war Chinese fighter strength was gathered around Shanghai. So, initially the Japanese army aircrews had a much “easier” time with more and more land-based (and floatplane) Japanese navy air units became involved in operations over Shanghai.

It was a stalemate for almost 2 months, with the Japanese Naval Infantry unable to break-out, and the Chinese divisions unable to remove them. It took further naval landings to outflank the defenders, and the subsequent inclusion of Japanese army troops (though I’m unsure of the exact timeline of their involvement) to push the Chinese defenders back along the Shanghai-Nanking-Wuhan axis. Almost all the Japanese involvement over this theatre of air operations was IJN, mainly land-based G3Ms and A5Ms, and some carrier-based A4N biplanes.

The next major air battles occurred in the defence of Wuhan Jan/Feb – October 1938. Initially some of the Chinese squadrons began re-equipping with Soviet-supplied fighters (Polikarpov 15s and 16s). Subsequently in mid-1938, two Soviet-manned fighter groups joined the fighting. At this stage the air operations in the south (around Wuhan) were still IJN based. The IJA units (starting to re-equip from the Ki-10 to the Ki-27) were based in the north, especially around the Manchurian-Soviet border, where incursions and skirmishes were taking place.

The main IJA air battles did not take place until the massive Nomonhan/Khalkhin-Gol air battles in late 1938 and early 1939 against Soviet fighters and bombers across a 100-mile front.

The impression I have from my reading (and this is from memory now), it that the pre-1940 Japanese army and navy air arms were relatively small. It would appear that in the course of operations between 1937-1939, the bulk of the pre-war IJN fighter force was rotated through the southern China theatre of operations. The 1937 to early-1938 air battles against pre-war Chinese fighter pilots (home-grown and American-Chinese volunteers, and predominantly German-trained) was a close-run thing until the IJN threw in large numbers of A5M fighters for escorts and fighter-sweeps. It became more evenly matched again when the Soviet “volunteers” arrived. It wasn’t until 1940, with the withdrawal of the Soviet aircrews and the arrival of the experimental A6M Zero squadron, that the IJN gained air dominancy in the south.

The IJA air units did not engage in significant air battles (mainly due to a lack of opposition) in their northern area of operations until the air battles against the Soviets over Nomonham. Almost the entire available force of Ki-27 fighters (supported by a few Ki-10 units) would be involved in the fighting. The Soviets would throw in larger numbers of reinforcements. Both air and ground fighting took place over a small patch of territory (the front was of the order of 100 miles). Both sides over-claimed dramatically in the air – again as a result of the very large numbers of aircraft involved over a small front. I don’t recall the exact numbers, but the leading Japanese ace claimed 93(?) kills. Total Soviet air losses were of the order of 100 aircraft. Both sides over-claimed in a big way, so I’m not just singling out the IJA crews.

From all that, I concluded with the opinion that by 1941, the IJN aircrews had a much longer period of air combat experience. The longer pre-war training process, which Leo indicated previously, meant the IJN land-based crews had as much flight experience as their IJA counterparts, and the IJN carrier capable aircrews were “a cut above” as with most naval aviation organisations…..and rightly entitled to swagger down the street (or is that just getting back on dry land again).

So all other things being taken into account, in December 1941, I would rate the average IJN aircrew being better than their IJA counterparts – better training, and more time to incorporate combat lessons learnt. The downside of being an IJN aviator, is that eventually you run up against similarly trained enemy (i.e. USN), and when your airfield (the floating one) is sunk, you stand less chance of surviving. At least an IJA aviator stuck on the ground and being bombed on his runway, can take shelter and live to fight another day.


...geoff