[bearoutwest]

Hi Leo,
I imagine that the US War Department would have passed the infomation on to both USAAF and USN. So I find it interesting that the USN found it necessary to develop tactics to benefit the F4F, whereas not a great deal seems to be written about any initial changes in USAAF P-40/P-39 tactics (apart from Chennault's directives to his AVG pilots).

Do you think it was because the USN had more time to reflect lessons learnt at Pearl Harbor before the next carrier clash in May 1942? Perhaps the USAAF in the Philippines being caught on the hop in December 1941 weren't in a possition to impement changes....and subsequently fighting on a withdrawal weren't able to make wholesale changes to tactics (i.e. heavy losses, lack of air raid warning, lack of numbers in the air, etc)?

Hi Guerra,
I see your point about the Zero Invincibilty Myth being in the mind of the IJN. I don't recall any changes in the manner that the navy fighter tactics operated. The IJN pilots always favoured manouverabilty, which was fine when you had large numbers of highly trained pilots, less fortunate when you had large numbers of rookies. Their flight discipline was always pretty good (I think) ....except when their Carrier CAP patrols all decided to chase after the Devestator torpedo bombers at Midway. The IJA flight tactics at Nomonhan (the large swirling bird-cage tactics) seemed to be similar to the ones Chennault reported over Rangoon. He (or one of his biographers) commented that it was like Samurai tactics of old....taunting the enemy to engage in one-v-one combat. The IJA seemed to dislike the AVG's "running away" hit-and-run tactics.

...geoff