[GuerraCivil]

Has there been studies of at what point LW dayfighter losses started to be clearly bigger than the number of downed Allied planes in the West? I think that the crucial point was achieved latest by early 1944 when Luftwaffe´s dayfighter losses were bigger than the combined losses by Allied daybombers and their escort fighters.

For example the verified combat records of 20.2.1944 in West (Reich Defence) show that Germans lost in that day 78 dayfighters (of which 53 single-engined) whereas Allied day losses were 21 heavy bombers and only 4 fighters. Things were only little better at the same air front on 24.2.1944 when Germans lost 53 dayfighters and Allied 44 heavy bombers and 10 fighters. The numbers show that Germans were losing the sky of Western Europe in daylight - the trend was already decisively toward bigger air combat losses of Germans and diminishing losses of Allied.

By January/February 1944 the German dayfighters had already abandoned the "finger four" formations in West (Defence of Reich) because there were not enough experienced pilots to keep "finger four" working and "schwarm" leaders had to keep more eye on unexperienced wingmen. This reduced to considerable degree the combat efficiency of German dayfighter formations.

My impression is that P-47´s were still more numerous dayfighter force in 8th USAAF by February 1944 and with drop tanks Thunderbolts could penetrate quite deeply over Germany. The P-51 B was of course even better as it could practically make "free hunt" almost overall of Germany but by Feb/March 1944 it was probably still the P-47 with drop tanks that made most of the job. The decisive defeat trend of Luftwaffe´s dayfighter force had been already settled before large numbers of P-51´s appeared to make things even worse for the Germans.

The P-47 started the downfall of Luftwaffe dayfighter force and P-51 finished the job. P-38, Spitfire and some other types contributed also but perhaps in lesser extent (limited numbers and Spitfire having the limitation of short range).

Of course the big picture was that Luftwaffe was hopelessly overstreched already by late 1942/early 1943 - just too many fronts to be handled effectively with limited resources: Defence of Reich, Mediterranean front, Eastern front. With more limited resources than the global Allied effort the Germans were destined to lose the war at all fronts.

Also the technological race was against Germans once Allied catched up. The Bf 109 F and FW 190 A were in late 1941/early 1942 the best fighters in the world, but by late 1942/early 1943 they were already catched by the Allied who could put in combat at all fronts equally good types (Spitfire IX, P-47, La 5) and develop even superior ones (P-51). The Bf 109 G and later A-models of FW 190 were not good enough to meet the challenge of improved Allied fighters.

Still in 1943 the sky over Northwestern Europe was quite effectively controlled by Luftwaffe and by that time it was yet able to inflict more aircraft losses to enemy than it suffered. For example the famous JG 26 made in Western front 380 air victory claims with the price of 158 pilots lost and even in 1944 it was still able to claim 668 air victories (the highest annual score of the unit during the war) for the loss of 300 pilots.

If the Defence of Reich would have been the only front where large numbers of German dayfighters were needed, it would have taken much more time from US/British combined efforts to achieve air dominance and win the war.