[drgondog]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

Has there been studies of at what point LW dayfighter losses started to be clearly bigger than the number of downed Allied planes in the West? I think that the crucial point was achieved latest by early 1944 when Luftwaffe´s dayfighter losses were bigger than the combined losses by Allied daybombers and their escort fighters.

Big Week did mark the first period during which the 8th AF lost fewer combined bomber/fighter MIA (not including written off or badly damaged after return. Using Caldwell's "Day Fighter in Defense of Reich" The 8th lost 157, (15th - 90) bombers; 33, 10 fighters vs LW 326 a/c, 170 KIA, 112 WIA.

Of that total of LW losses the following victory credits were assigned to 8th, 9th and 15th AF FC. P-38 (43), P-47 (80), P-51 (64.5) --- Extracted from USAF Study 85 by me..

By January/February 1944 the German dayfighters had already abandoned the "finger four" formations in West (Defence of Reich) because there were not enough experienced pilots to keep "finger four" working and "schwarm" leaders had to keep more eye on unexperienced wingmen. This reduced to considerable degree the combat efficiency of German dayfighter formations.

Interesting, but what is the source.

My impression is that P-47´s were still more numerous dayfighter force in 8th USAAF by February 1944 and with drop tanks Thunderbolts could penetrate quite deeply over Germany.

Both the 9th and 8th AF P-47 FG's were flying escort to the 8th AF. As of February 20, 1944 there were 10 P-47 FG's, two P-51 FG's and two P-38FG's. The 15th had several more P-47 FG's but only the four P-38 FG's had the range to escort to Austria/Southern Germany.

The P-47s, at this time could only fly Penetration and Withdrawal escorts perhaps as far as Stuttgart to Dummer Lake radius during Big Week, leaving deep penetrations of three Bomb Divisions of approximately 10BG's each to the two P-38 and two P-51FG's to the target from intermediate range.

The P-51 B was of course even better as it could practically make "free hunt" almost overall of Germany but by Feb/March 1944 it was probably still the P-47 with drop tanks that made most of the job. The decisive defeat trend of Luftwaffe´s dayfighter force had been already settled before large numbers of P-51´s appeared to make things even worse for the Germans.

I would assert that the P-47's effectiveness as bomber escort ended from Dummer Lake to Stuttgart. During the period October 15, 1943 through mid January the 8th AF did not penetrate much beyond the effective radius of the P-47D. Further, during that specific period the Lwbh Mitte was replaced by LuftFlotte Reich and massively reinforced from East and South. They also carefully avoided clashes until the bombers reached Hamburg, Kiel, Kassel, Hannover at the far reach of the P-47. The effective numerical strength of the 8th and 9th AF P-47 groups was ~ 500 operationally and ~750 On Hand

The P-47 started the downfall of Luftwaffe dayfighter force and P-51 finished the job. P-38, Spitfire and some other types contributed also but perhaps in lesser extent (limited numbers and Spitfire having the limitation of short range).

I agree the statement. The question discussed is which fighter had the capability to fly and fight wherever the LW operated in the West - all the way to Poland and Czechoslovakia as contrast to 'all the way to Stuttgart or Dummer Lake?"

Of course the big picture was that Luftwaffe was hopelessly overstreched already by late 1942/early 1943 - just too many fronts to be handled effectively with limited resources: Defence of Reich, Mediterranean front, Eastern front. With more limited resources than the global Allied effort the Germans were destined to lose the war at all fronts.


Still in 1943 the sky over Northwestern Europe was quite effectively controlled by Luftwaffe and by that time it was yet able to inflict more aircraft losses to enemy than it suffered. For example the famous JG 26 made in Western front 380 air victory claims with the price of 158 pilots lost and even in 1944 it was still able to claim 668 air victories (the highest annual score of the unit during the war) for the loss of 300 pilots.

If the Defence of Reich would have been the only front where large numbers of German dayfighters were needed, it would have taken much more time from US/British combined efforts to achieve air dominance and win the war.

The LW, technically inflicted more casualties as each bomber lost to US meant 10 MIA. What they lost was the ability to deny the US the ability to strike anywhere with acceptable losses under 5% (max) after May 1944.

Another note: using JG 26 as an example, losses in pilots KIA is not reflective of operational losses for the same reason. More than 50% of JG 26 pilots shot down survived, bailed out and continued the fight - whereas a loss by an 8th/9th FC pilot was a loss for the war.