[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

Has there been studies of at what point LW dayfighter losses started to be clearly bigger than the number of downed Allied planes in the West? I think that the crucial point was achieved latest by early 1944 when Luftwaffe´s dayfighter losses were bigger than the combined losses by Allied daybombers and their escort fighters.

Hello GuerraCivil,

Thank you for taking the discussion further. Since this is a very interesting subject for me and I would like to respond to the points made by other members as well, I will focus on the two main themes in your post. I have also sent you a PM.
You are correct in the sense that in February 1944 the Luftwaffe fighter losses exceeded total USAAF losses by 397 to 387 (from Caldwell’s Day Fighters). I do not agree that this was in any sense a critical point. The Luftwaffe fighter loss rate in missions against the Eighth had already reached 5% by May 1943, which was intolerably high in view of other commitments. The point of crisis was reached in spring and summer 1943, not any later.

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

Also the technological race was against Germans once Allied catched up. The Bf 109 F and FW 190 A were in late 1941/early 1942 the best fighters in the world, but by late 1942/early 1943 they were already catched by the Allied who could put in combat at all fronts equally good types (Spitfire IX, P-47, La 5) and develop even superior ones (P-51). The Bf 109 G and later A-models of FW 190 were not good enough to meet the challenge of improved Allied fighters.

Still in 1943 the sky over Northwestern Europe was quite effectively controlled by Luftwaffe and by that time it was yet able to inflict more aircraft losses to enemy than it suffered. For example the famous JG 26 made in Western front 380 air victory claims with the price of 158 pilots lost and even in 1944 it was still able to claim 668 air victories (the highest annual score of the unit during the war) for the loss of 300 pilots.

You have slightly mis-stated the differences in fighter performance. In 1941 and into 1942, the 109 and 190 were superior to the Spitfire, but not overwhelmingly so. It was only in defensive operations conducted over Europe that the best Luftwaffe pilots were able to achieve the highly favourable victory-to-loss ratio against the Spitfire V that has provoked so much comment. This success was bought at the cost of restricting 190 deliveries exclusively to the Western Front for far too long, with negative effects on the Mediterranean and Eastern theatres. A good comparison would be the long delay by the RAF in sending Spitfires to the Middle East and India.

The Spitfire IX and P-47 were both fundamentally superior to both the 109 and 190, because the Spitfire had a two-stage supercharger, while the P-47 had a turbocharger. As a result, the Allied types had a decisive advantage in high-altitude performance, while the P-47 also possessed superior range compared with Luftwaffe fighters. As a result, both the Spitfire IX and the P-47 had an immediate effect on Luftwaffe operations once they entered operational service, out of proportion to the small number of these aircraft that were initially deployed.

As to the tactical air combat over Western Europe in 1943, I have to disagree with your assessment. JG 26 had 171 pilots on strength on 31 December 1942, so the 158 casualties during the year were almost 100% of initial strength (figures taken from Caldwell’s JG 26: Top Guns). This was a catastrophic loss rate, especially in view of the fact that many of those lost were amongst the most experienced fighter pilots in the Luftwaffe. An example of the difficulties JG 26 was experiencing is provided by the combat on 3 September 1943, when it lost 3 190s and 2 pilots in the process of shooting down just 3 B-17s, before Zemke’s 56 FG arrived and shot down 2 more 190s with their pilots for the loss a single Thunderbolt. This is the sort of case that you were looking for, when the total number of Luftwaffe losses exceeded those of the USAAF, and this shows that the situation was catastrophic for the Germans even in autumn 1943.

The counter-factual concentration of all available German fighters against the Allies might not have changed the situation significantly, because of the issue of Allied technological superiority described above.

Regards,

Paul