[drgondog]

Juha - you also touched on a VERY important tactical advantage the Allies developed in 1944. For the 8th AF there were two very important communications development which proved to be a force multiplier.

The first was the excellent co-ordination between bomber task force leaders and 8th/9th AF escort Group and Fighter Squadron commanders via C Channel. This enabled US fighters the ability to hear and respond to cries for help from various bomb groups under attack where the fighter escort was not locally positioned. There are countless examples where a Fighter Group leader heard the call, then dispatched a squadron to go forward or backward to help out.

The second was Type 16 or Beachyhead, etc, ground based radar searching for unidentified swarms of aircraft and directing US/RAF fighters on Sweeps or Area Patrols to intercept.

The other subtlety, often missed, is that the overall practice and precision of organizing the 8th BC over East Anglia - per plan and timing - along with discipline from 8th FC to pick up their assigned bombers, by position, as identified by Tail code, much more often than not placed the fighters in effective escort position.

Neither the RAF, nor the LW ever demonstrated the ability to place 500 to 2000 bombers in the right place and time for a small (relatively) force of fighters to escort the bombers in relays. The RAF doctrine of night attacks made the requirement non important - but the LW had great difficulty in organizing many units from disparate locations into a large attacking force -