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Old 18th July 2015, 23:05
GuerraCivil GuerraCivil is offline
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Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

About LW having abandoned the "finger four" at the western front by the beginning of 1944 my source is Caldwell: JG 26, Top Guns of the Luftwaffe. (page 224 in my Finnish edition).

Caldwell also gave me the idea to think that P-47 achieved aereal domination over Western Europe before the P-51 with longer range replaced it (page 396 in my edition of "Top Guns"). To make it more precise: P-47 Razorback achieved air superiority for the Allied in the areas of its range before P-51 B extended the airwar even further into German airspace. Probably also the Spitfire IX was able to turn the balance at the areas of its limited range.

When it comes to German dayfighter losses of Big Week (Feb. 1944) and the role of 8th USAAF fighters in it, I guess that ten Fighter Groups of P-47īs still shot down more German fighters than two Fighter Groups of P-51īs (+ 2 Fighter Groups of P-38) despite the more limited range of P-47īs? Even the bombing targets in the limited range of P-47īs had to be defended by Germans and thus they had to accept to facing P-47 escorts and subsequent losses in fighter vs. fighter -combat when defending the targets inside the range of P-47.

From the book of David Isby (The Decisive Duel Spitfire vs. 109, p. 362-363) about the situation of Luftwaffe by the end of March 1944: during first three months of 1944 Luftwaffe lost 3091 fighters of which 70,5 % in the defence of Germany and in the west: "For the fighter units (of LW) this was like losing Battle of Britain every month repeated without ceasing".

Fom the posts above one can conclude that the decisive change happened already in 1943 although Luftwaffe could still win big single battles against 8th USAAF bombers. Although well armed, even the heavy bombers could not be flown unescorted into well-defended enemy airspace in daylight with acceptable losses - this was what the Germans were yet able to demonstrate convincingly. Although the exaggerated air victory claims of the gunners of US bombers were taken granted at their time (at least in the official Allied propaganda) even they were not enough to make the loss rates of unescorted bombers acceptable.

From the book of Isby I found out also that Germans were still in late 1943 able to win battles at some secondary fronts like the East Aegean (the Dodecanese Campaign). Bf 109īs were still able to achieve air superiority over Spitfires there in autumn 1943. (Isby 2012, p. 300-301)

Although the eastern front was considered "easy" or at least easier than west by LW fighter pilots, it may have contributed to the downgrading of pilot training in late 1942. According to sources referred by Isby many German fighter schools were closed/downgraded by then and lots of instructors sent to help in east. During late 1942/beginning of early 1943 the Stalingrad battle caused a loss of 1000 trained aircrews to Luftwaffe, including many "irreplacebale" instructors. Isby: Future Bf 109 pilots would not learn to fly on instruments because their instructors had died in Stalingrad (campaign). (Isby 2012, p. 286).
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