Quote:
Originally Posted by drgondog
While I agree Paul's general comments, one has to be careful regarding the loss statistics vs the readiness status to 'compete'. If I used that analysis and applied it to say, the 355th or 4th FG's over a period of time - one would judge both to be ineffective based on losses.
Typical AAF ETO fighter pilot strength ranged from 80 in September 1943 to 100 in December 1944 to 110 in April 1945.
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Hello Bill,
Thank you very much for providing a great degree of higly relevant detail! I agree that comparing losses to initial unit strength can be deceptive, depending on the volume of pilot flow compared to the initial stock. As you noted, the comparative statistics don't seem to be readily available, but in general terms JG 26 would have had a far smaller flow of pilots being rotated or reassigned. The USAAF fighter groups should have had significantly more pilots than JG 26 over the course of the year, relative to average unit stength.
You are right to highlight that the rate of attrition of less experienced pilots was far higher, the same conclusion was reached by the
Red Baron studies of the Vietnam War and this seems to be an established general rule for most types of combat. I was able to briefly look through
Top Guns just now for the losses of JG 26 commanders and I can say that they were high, 2 Gruppe COs (Galland and Seifert) and 4 Staffel COs (Ebersberger, Keller, Ruppert and Zink). That's only looking at those killed and only out of those who held commands at the end of 1942. I don't know the relevant data for the 355th, but I imagine the loss of commanders were considerably smaller and hence the overall effect on unit cohesion lower.
Regards,
Paul