Quote:
Originally Posted by drgondog
Juha - you also touched on a VERY important tactical advantage the Allies developed in 1944. For the 8th AF there were two very important communications development which proved to be a force multiplier.
The first was the excellent co-ordination between bomber task force leaders and 8th/9th AF escort Group and Fighter Squadron commanders via C Channel...
Neither the RAF, nor the LW ever demonstrated the ability to place 500 to 2000 bombers in the right place and time for a small (relatively) force of fighters to escort the bombers in relays. The RAF doctrine of night attacks made the requirement non important - but the LW had great difficulty in organizing many units from disparate locations into a large attacking force -
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Bill, you and Juha are right to emphasise the development of electronic warfare. May I ask for a good source for USAAF EW developments? There is some data on Luftwaffe radio interception in a November 1944 AMWIS posted by David Isby on his excellent website,
http://spitfirevsbf109.com/files/Rad...ioTracking.pdf .
Radar was important, but I doubt it had much strategic significance for the bombing campaign. Judging by this link -
http://www.qsl.net/p/pe1ngz//airforc...radar-old.html - AMES Type 16 was broadly similar to a Würzburg-Riese, so it couldn't provide GCI support for missions deep into occupied territory. Quite possibly the USAAF tactics that you talked about, Bill, were more important than any radar support. In Vietnam, the EC-121Ts provided very advanced radar technology, but they did not lead to a decisive change in the air war, because of rigid tactics and political constraints.
The Eighth and the broader USAAF in Europe were very impressive organisations once they had reached peak efficiency, that is indisputable. This was partly because of their enormous size. On 2 November 1944, the day of the famous defeat for the Luftwaffe, the Eighth put up 1,100 effective heavy bomber sorties and 873 escort sorties. I. Jagdkorps could only launch 490 sorties in response. With that kind of US numerical superiority reinforcing the organisational advantages that you described, the Luftwaffe could not fight effectively. In fact, the Eighth was huge even when compared with Bomber Command. The 11 March 1945 record-breaking RAF attack on Essen was flown by 1,079 aircraft, including 36 Mosquitoes (data from Middlebrook's
War Diaries). The Eighth not only had more aircraft, but they were also higher-performance, with the B-17s especially having a higher practical ceiling on operations than the Lancaster and Halifax, as well as a much heavier armament.
I am expanding the post because I've just seen your reply above, took too long to type up my own message!
Quote:
Originally Posted by drgondog
In all fairness to your original observation about the losses of 1943 JG 26 we should also remember that Jagdgeschwader strength of say 12 squadrons would map more closely to 3 8th AF FG with 9 squadrons of 16 aircraft (on operations) and as far TO&E, including full staffing of flights plus Group HQ pilots, would be closer to 25 per squadron in late 1943 plus 4 per HQ
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Of course, the German JGs were much bigger. I would caveat your correction with the observation that USAAF groups fought as a whole unit quite often,
while the Jagdgeschwader concentrated very rarely. The Luftwaffe was very late in forming the multi-Gruppe Gefechtsverbande, in my opinion.
Quote:
Originally Posted by drgondog
Absolutely true, The 355th lost a Deputy Group CO in November 1943 (evaded) and another Deputy Group CO in June 1944 plus one 357FS CO in May 1944 plus another 358FS CO in March 1945. All flak related except first one. An anomaly for the 355th is that of 21 air aces, none were shot down by LW fighter - six were downed related to strafing (one rescued behind enemy lines, one WIA/evaded, three were POW and one was KIA).
The experience levels of the lost aces were much higher - the one rescued was my father, a major and 354FS CO, one evaded/WIA (Captain Cullerton-flight leader and second highest strafer), one POW was top ace (Capt Henry Brown - flight leader), one POW (major Lenfest- 354FS Ops Officer -stuck in mud trying to rescue Brown) the first 355th ace (Capt Norm Olson 357FS Ops Officer) and one high altitude flak (Capt Koraleski - 354 Ops officer.)
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Very interesting, thank you yet again! Do you think the absence of losses in air combat was because the 355 FG pilots were especially skilled, or because the Luftwaffe skills happened to be eroding? A broader question that arises from this is why P-51 aces were permitted to strafe so often. It did cause damage to the Luftwaffe, but it also seems an unecessary gamble with the vulnerability of the Merlin cooling system to be taken into account.
Regards,
Paul