Quote:
Originally Posted by GuerraCivil
About LW having abandoned the "finger four" at the western front by the beginning of 1944 my source is Caldwell: JG 26, Top Guns of the Luftwaffe. (page 224 in my Finnish edition).
Caldwell also gave me the idea to think that P-47 achieved aereal domination over Western Europe before the P-51 with longer range replaced it (page 396 in my edition of "Top Guns"). To make it more precise: P-47 Razorback achieved air superiority for the Allied in the areas of its range before P-51 B extended the airwar even further into German airspace. Probably also the Spitfire IX was able to turn the balance at the areas of its limited range.
I respect Don's opinions and we have had the discussion before. What I point out is the P-47 did well against the LW, when the LW chose to engage within the operational radius of the P-47. Unfortunately the concept of Strategic Air Power stopped at that radius, but beyond that radius the LW was able to engage in heavy number with both s/e and t/e day fighters plus bring t/e night fighters to bear with no concern about fighter escort. You COULD say the Spit IX and P-47D were more or less establishing air superiority almost to Hannover, past Frankfurt and down to Stuttgart - leaving German Oil, Chemical, Aircraft engines and airframes and Ball Bearings safely protected - until the Mustang B with 85 gallon fuselage tank added.
When it comes to German dayfighter losses of Big Week (Feb. 1944) and the role of 8th USAAF fighters in it, I guess that ten Fighter Groups of P-47īs still shot down more German fighters than two Fighter Groups of P-51īs (+ 2 Fighter Groups of P-38) despite the more limited range of P-47īs? Even the bombing targets in the limited range of P-47īs had to be defended by Germans and thus they had to accept to facing P-47 escorts and subsequent losses in fighter vs. fighter -combat when defending the targets inside the range of P-47.
True, but to set the context properly, one of the Mustang groups had only been operational 9 days. To better frame the discussion in two more weeks two more Mustang groups became operational and combine they destroyed more German fighters than all the P-47 FG's combined between Big Week and March 31...
From the book of David Isby (The Decisive Duel Spitfire vs. 109, p. 362-363) about the situation of Luftwaffe by the end of March 1944: during first three months of 1944 Luftwaffe lost 3091 fighters of which 70,5 % in the defence of Germany and in the west: "For the fighter units (of LW) this was like losing Battle of Britain every month repeated without ceasing".
Fom the posts above one can conclude that the decisive change happened already in 1943 although Luftwaffe could still win big single battles against 8th USAAF bombers. Although well armed, even the heavy bombers could not be flown unescorted into well-defended enemy airspace in daylight with acceptable losses - this was what the Germans were yet able to demonstrate convincingly. Although the exaggerated air victory claims of the gunners of US bombers were taken granted at their time (at least in the official Allied propaganda) even they were not enough to make the loss rates of unescorted bombers acceptable.
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Recall that of the 3091 fighters lost in Q1 ( or whatever the number was) that a considerable number of strafing losses to Mustangs occurred in that March and succeeding months. Those are also operational losses due to all causes.
If we pick on March/April 1944 to parse Defense of Reich losses against 8th and AF ---- from Caldwell's Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich
MAR, 1944 LF-Reich
sorties=2464 Losses=354, KIA/WIA=202 (Dominantly Mustang)
MAR LF-3
sorties =1094 Losses =70, KIA/WIA=43 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)
APR, 1944 LF-Reich
sorties =3487 Losses =370, KIA/WIA=206 (Dominantly Mustang)
APR LF-3
sorties =1100 Losses =48, KIA/WIA=19 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)
1943 Total LF_Reich or Mitte
sorties =13,377 Losses =703, KIA/WIA=396 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)
1943 Total LF-3
sorties =7294, Losses =278, KIA/WIA=134 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)
Observation - the Mustang did not get all the aircraft destroyed against the LF-Reich, some were due the bombers, some were due the P-38, a few P-47. Similarly not all the VC's against LF-3 were P-47s and Spits, some were by Mustangs and P-38s over lowlands and France.
Summary - an extraordinary total of KIA/WIA losses by the LW in March and April 1944 were primarily due to Mustangs - and Nearly as many as all of 1943