[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Recall that of the 3091 fighters lost in Q1 ( or whatever the number was) that a considerable number of strafing losses to Mustangs occurred in that March and succeeding months. Those are also operational losses due to all causes.

If we pick on March/April 1944 to parse Defense of Reich losses against 8th and AF ---- from Caldwell's Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich
MAR, 1944 LF-Reich...

Observation - the Mustang did not get all the aircraft destroyed against the LF-Reich, some were due the bombers, some were due the P-38, a few P-47. Similarly not all the VC's against LF-3 were P-47s and Spits, some were by Mustangs and P-38s over lowlands and France.

Summary - an extraordinary total of KIA/WIA losses by the LW in March and April 1944 were primarily due to Mustangs - and Nearly as many as all of 1943

Hello Bill,

I am also sceptical of the Q1 number, it does feel more like the total of losses to all causes, but I will try to look that up and clarify.

The extracted data does support your point and I think it is unambiguously true that the Mustang was the main tool of the Luftwaffe's destruction during Big Week and the period up to D-Day. I have added up the total losses of twin-engine Luftwaffe aircraft presented in Don's book and I think the numbers highlight the influence of the Mustang's long range in 1944, even though these losses were not exclusively due to P-51s:
Q3 1943 – 25 aircraft
Q4 1943 – 132
Q1 1944 – 308 (12 times as many as in Q3 1943)
Q2 1944 –185

Coming back to what was happening in 1943, I extracted the full list of commander casualties from Don Caldwell's website. The Spitfire was the most commmon cause of loss (7 out of 21 cases), followed by the B-17 (4 cases) and P-47 (3 cases). I think that this kind of evidence clearly supports my view that the Luftwaffe was under extreme pressure by early to mid-1943 and that even the early operations of the Eighth caused a crisis. The point that I would highlight about targets outside of P-47, or even Spitfire, range is that attacks on those targets constituted an attempt to win air dominance rather than just air superiority, which had already been won in the Fighter Command operational area. To return to a point I have made previously, air dominance was not strictly necessary to secure Allied landings or win the war more generally. Table of JG 26 losses below:

9/8/43 Beese, Artur Oblt. WIA 1 CO W of Cambrai Spitfire
5/14/43 Borris, Karl Hptm. WIA 8 CO Issigen-Wevelgem B-17
10/24/43 Ebersberger, Kurt Hptm. KIA 4 CO 3km S of Hesdin Spitfire
8/17/43 Galland, Wilhelm-Ferdinand Maj. KIA II CO nr Liege-5km W Maastricht P-47
4/5/43 Geisshardt, Fritz Hptm. KIA III CO Ghent B-17
12/1/43 Hoppe, Helmut Hptm. KIA 5 CO Epinoy a/f Spitfire
7/31/43 Kelch, Günther Hptm. KIFA 7 CO Neuwerk-Knechtsiel crashed
3/24/43 Keller, Paul Oblt. KIA 10J CO Ashford own bomb
5/14/43 Leykauf, Erwin Oblt. no 12/54 CO Wevelgem a/f taxi
4/15/43 Matuschka, Siegfried Oblt. KIA 4/54 CO near St. Inglevert Spitfire
3/20/43 Mietusch, Klaus Hptm. WIA 7 CO Krasnogvardeisk a/f engine
6/22/43 Naumann, Hans Hptm. WIA 6 CO near Antwerp P-47
6/13/43 Ruppert, Kurt Hptm. KIA III CO Neumünster B-17
11/25/43 Seifert, Johannes Obstlt. KIA II CO nr Bethune-5km S of Estaires P-38 - coll
10/10/43 Staiger, Hermann Hptm. WIA 12 CO near Dorsten B-17
5/13/43 Stammberger, Otto Oblt. WIA 4 CO near St. Omer Spitfire
11/3/43 Steindl, Peter-Paul Hptm. WIA 11 CO E Friesland-Holtgast P-47
6/17/43 Sternberg, Horst Oblt. WIA 5 CO W of Hazebrouck Spitfire
11/29/43 Sternberg, Horst Oblt. WIFA 6 CO c/l Lille-Nord a/f Spitfire
3/5/43 Zink, Fülbert Hptm. no 2 CO S of Shvinochovo combat
3/14/43 Zink, Fülbert Hptm. KIA 2 CO E of Werschinskojec missing

Regards,

Paul