Quote:
Originally Posted by drgondog
Paul - I will respond to various questions after I get back from a day trip.
My only point in favor of JG 26 is that comparing losses based on pilot staffing and aircraft availability suggests comparing one JG (i.e. JG 2 or JG 26) losses against three US Fighter Groups. The three US Fighter Group loss comparison for 1943 through August means looking to all the losses of the 4th, 56th and 78th FG then factor RAF losses to the JG 26 also to try to normalize loss per sortie comparison.
Having said that, when a US or Brit pilot escapes the cockpit - he is 99% POW or DOW whereas the JG 26 pilot returns to fight again.
Other comments
Briefly the Type 16 and Beachyhead Control was limited in range - extremely useful during the Normandy campaign, Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge, but not at all useful in the Battle of Germany. The aircraft to aircraft communications from bomber leaders to fighter leaders was extremely important.
To the question of 'low air to air losses for the 355th'.. The 355th finished fifth in air combat victory credits with 355 air, 508 ground for losses of 41 air/90 strafing credits.
The 4th FG by contrast had 549 air/461 ground for losses of 86 air/92 strafing
The 56th had 665 air/320 ground for losses of 54 air/84 strafing
The 352nd had 504 air/275 ground for losses of 41 air/41 strafing
The 357th had 595 air/107 ground for losses of 55 air/36 strafing
These are the four ahead of 355th in air to air totals - all except the 4th FG had superior air to air statistics but all also had several aces downed in air combat. Why? I have no answer but will observe that all were more aggressive about leaving escort to pursue German fighters - that is a leadership trait based on "stick with the bombers' versus "Pursue and destroy" (IMO).
That doesn't, statistically, explain why the 355th had no air to air losses of aces as they had more air victory credits than the trailing nine Fighter Groups and had a better ratio than say the 78th, the 353rd, the 20th, the 55th, the 359th and 364th FG's.
As well as the 4th FG, which is more explainable as they had more engagements by a significant margin.
There were more 355th Flight, Squadron and HQ leaders lost than I named in the previous post but all except three (non aces but one had 4.5 VC's) were downed by flak.
I have no real explanations for the anomaly
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Bill,
Thank you for the great comparative data about the USAAF fighter groups. I look forward to your post when you come back with considerable interest. The research task that you outlined would be very worthwhile, in my opinion. My hypothesis is that the RAF and especially the USAAF loss rates would be far lower than the JG 26 rate, both for the entire units concerned and for their various commanders.
Your point about the dominant important of radio reinforces what many other sources say. The SCR-522 and related sets were probably the best available to any combatant air force at the time, so this was another important measure where US technological superiority affected the operational and strategic level of the air war.
Your explanation for the 355th as a statistical outlier sounds right to me in view of the fact that we discussed earlier, that Luftwaffe fighters had orders to attack the bombers above all else. That was a self-defeating approach, to my mind, but the Luftwaffe did not have another reasonable alternative. It is thus possible that those groups which stuck more closely to the bombers would meet German fighters less often, as the German formations would have been broken up by other units. I'll try to look up data on the 332nd, that may shed some light on this specific hypothesis.
I don't think that the absence of ace losses in air combat is necessarily such an extraordinary anomaly. Ace losses across the Eighth were fairly low, at least in air combat, certainly by the standards of the Soviet and German equivalents. It could be that if a statistical distribution is constructed, it would suggest that more fighter groups 'should' not have lost aces!
Regards,
Paul