Quote:
Originally Posted by drgondog
Paul - by the very nature of a very high population of 'aces', the Attack attitude against German fighters in any concentration was prevalent. So, by the very nature of the beast he is constantly engaging and thereby places himself at greater risk than those pilots at flight lead (or even squadron and Group lead) that were more content to hold escort positions rather than engage. So, I do expect more air to air losses in aces due to the increased combat probability and the very real possibility of being hit from behind while concentrating on someone in front of you. Frequently, the wingman was hit first... but once that type of fight has been engaged the ods of being shot down yourself are higher...
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Hello Bill,
My appologies for not getting back earlier, had my schedule disrupted by travel in the last couple of days. I see the force of your point that aces are by nature aggressive and so should be at higher risk than other pilots. I probably can't say anything useful on this specific subject without doing a lot more research, but I can offer a hypothesis that perhaps the aggressiveness of the aces in the 355th was somewhat restrained by the attitude of the group's leadership, is there any truth in that suggestion?
With regard to the point about Luftwaffe fighters diving away, the technical issue that we discussed above was of critical importance. In a sense, Göring was ordering what had been good Luftwaffe practice for years, but it was not much use against the Thunderbolt and Mustang. There must also have been a problem of skill erosion on the German side. Many aces of all the various wartime air forces record being able to defend themselves when diving to disengage, even against higher-performance aircraft. This required good aerobatic skills and a high level of situational awareness, so inexperienced pilots would have had particular problems in these situations.
I wonder whether more aggressive German tactics could have actually killed many new USAAF fighter pilots. Since the USAAF did suspend deep penetration raids after Second Schweinfurt, I think it is likely they would have done the same if German tactics suddenly improved and caused a high loss rate among the escorts. The USAAF and RAF had the numbers by 1943 to maintain air dominance over the Benelux and northern France in virtually any circumstances, unless Speer’s ministry would have somehow managed to produce thousands of Me 262s and get them in service before it was too late. As it was, you are entirely correct to point out that the USAAF fighter groups rapidly accumulated experience because of their comparatively low loss rates.
I haven’t been able to find the 332nd air-to-air loss statistics in books, but I found the VC totals in the Osprey Aviation Elite title for this group. The total is 119 kills, 8.5 probables, 27 damaged . There were nine pilots with 3 or more confirmed kills. The most important reason for the comparatively low claim total of the 332nd was probably the weakness of the Luftwaffe in southern Europe after June and especially autumn 1944.
Regards,
Paul