Originally Posted by Paul Thompson
Hello Bill,
My appologies for not getting back earlier, had my schedule disrupted by travel in the last couple of days. I see the force of your point that aces are by nature aggressive and so should be at higher risk than other pilots. I probably can't say anything useful on this specific subject without doing a lot more research, but I can offer a hypothesis that perhaps the aggressiveness of the aces in the 355th was somewhat restrained by the attitude of the group's leadership, is there any truth in that suggestion?
I do feel that Colonel Bill Cummings was less aggressive than Blakeslee, Martin, Zemke, Mason, Dregne and several others of 1943 and 1944 vintage. When he led the group he was focused on protecting the bombers to the point of not personally leading an attack on the LW and reigning in his squadron CO's. When he was Not leading the 355th on a particular day, his appointed Group CO for that mission were aggressive (Kinnard, Dix, Marshall, Kucheman, Szaniawski, Hovde, Elder, Myers, Graham, Sluga). There are many examples where the 355th chose to stay in relative close escort - and in many cases fill in for unprotected bomber boxes elsewhere, when big fights were spotted nearby. I am not criticizing Cummings. He served as the longest continuous Fighter Group commander in the ETO - from November 1942 when it was activated through early November 1944. No one else was close in the ETO and offhand maybe not in AAF.
Also in fairness to Cummings, his 355th went from near last in victory credits for 8th FC Fighter Groups as of March 1944 to number three in total aircraft destroyed behind 56th FG and 4th FG by the end of April. The 355th finished in the top third with air and top in ground destruction under his leadership with a combined low loss to assigned bombers relative to other groups... but certainly not close to 332nd statistics of 27+.
With regard to the point about Luftwaffe fighters diving away, the technical issue that we discussed above was of critical importance. In a sense, Göring was ordering what had been good Luftwaffe practice for years, but it was not much use against the Thunderbolt and Mustang. There must also have been a problem of skill erosion on the German side. Many aces of all the various wartime air forces record being able to defend themselves when diving to disengage, even against higher-performance aircraft. This required good aerobatic skills and a high level of situational awareness, so inexperienced pilots would have had particular problems in these situations.
The LW could always out dive the P-38 because of the critical Mach issues arising from its fat wing - but not the P-47 or P-51, and in particular the P-51 because of the delayed drag rise of the laminar flow wing coupled with only a small movement of the Center of pressure during the Mach transition. Until the P-47D-25 (?? have to check) put a dive flap at 30% chord the P-47 stick forces were very high - similar to but not as bad as the P-38 - due to the rearward movement of the CP during BL separation.
On the other hand the 109 and 190 could always out dive the VVS counterparts in a tough situation, It is likely that the experienced LW pilot transitioning from East did not know that the Dive was Not an effective disengagement maneuver in the ETO.
I wonder whether more aggressive German tactics could have actually killed many new USAAF fighter pilots. Since the USAAF did suspend deep penetration raids after Second Schweinfurt, I think it is likely they would have done the same if German tactics suddenly improved and caused a high loss rate among the escorts.
I believe they could have bought some time - but not without out high cost of "trade attrition" - which the US and RAF could afford. The net result is that a lot of talented US fighter pilots gained experience to combine natural ability and aggressiveness with tactical knowledge - and go on to become Very good fighter pilots and fill leadership positions with depth and breadth in ETO fighter squadrons.
Many of the future fighter aces and flight/squadron leaders may have been taken out of the fight - thereby delaying the crushing combination of many experienced pilots - quickly- with the technical tools of parity or better in the escort aircraft.
The USAAF and RAF had the numbers by 1943 to maintain air dominance over the Benelux and northern France in virtually any circumstances, unless Speer’s ministry would have somehow managed to produce thousands of Me 262s and get them in service before it was too late. As it was, you are entirely correct to point out that the USAAF fighter groups rapidly accumulated experience because of their comparatively low loss rates.
I haven’t been able to find the 332nd air-to-air loss statistics in books, but I found the VC totals in the Osprey Aviation Elite title for this group. The total is 119 kills, 8.5 probables, 27 damaged . There were nine pilots with 3 or more confirmed kills. The most important reason for the comparatively low claim total of the 332nd was probably the weakness of the Luftwaffe in southern Europe after June and especially autumn 1944.
Regards,
Paul
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