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Originally Posted by GuerraCivil
The more inflated the air victory stats is the more false picture it gives about the efficiency of certain air units, certain tactics and certain strategy.
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Hello GuerraCivil,
It has been well established in books such as Lundstrom’s that numbers of claims are in fact the
least reliable of all the statistics produced by fighter units. The only way to analyse what you term the ‘efficiency’ of air forces or individual units is to look at the documents of their opponents and check statistics of aircraft and aircrew losses, the number of missions completed successfully and so on. This is best done at the strategic level, rather than for single units, because the success of a single unit did not necessarily have much significance for the war as a whole.
Quote:
Originally Posted by GuerraCivil
The RAF failed to achieve enough positive results in 1941-1942 with Circus operations and the actual kill/loss -stats were highly unfavourable for RAF - big numerical superiority did not bring the hoped air dominance over Western Europe.
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Conflating the raw numbers of losses with operational success is misleading. The RAF tied down and inflicted significant attrition on the two best Luftwaffe Jagdgeschwader at a time when the Geremans needed as manmy fighters as possible in the other theatres.
Quote:
Originally Posted by GuerraCivil
How much did the inflated RAF kill/loss -stats with these operations effect in the continuing somewhat dubious strategy and committing too many Spitfires in rather futile operations is very interesting question. Many Spitfires would have found better service outside of Britain much earlier like sending them to defend Malta and stregthening DAF in North Africa by late 1941/early 1942.
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The main reason for the cross-Channel operations was the perceived need to maintain pressure on the Germans and appease Stalin’s ever more vicious demands for a second front, numbers of claims played very little role in the strategic decisions made. You are correct on the subject of greater utility of Spitfires elsewhere, the problem in the Mediterranean and Malaya was that the British over-estimated the fighting power of their land forces and partly the Royal Navy too. As a result, the RAF had to carry a very high burden in these theatres.
Regards,
Paul