Quote:
Originally Posted by Paul Thompson
Hello Juha,
You are right to an extent, that the long naval route consumed a large amount of time. The key issue is that the RAF could afford to send 200 or more Spitfires to the Mediterranean in 1941 and never return any of them home, because of the superior production rates of British aviation industry. The British exaggerated the German threat by grossly over-estimating German production and effective strength, which had a very negative effect on the British war effort. By combining data on production, strength and losses of the RAF and Luftwaffe, it is possible to see that by 1941 'the game was up' for the Germans, unless they could rapidly defeat the USSR and rapidly exploit its industrial resources. This was possible, but Hitler and his henchmen did not see the nature of the problem with sufficient clarity. On the other hand, Churchill was very concerned about British political endurance and felt forced to tolerate the over-insurance endemic in so many Allied operations during the war.
Regards,
Paul
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Yes, but decisions had to be made besed on the info in hand. Germany had strong industrial base and at least in some circles in GB it was seen as very effective, even model state already at the beginning of the 20th century. Because it is usually more dangerous to underestimate than overestimate one's enemies, it isn't surprising that GB wanted to play safe. It was understandable to think that under dictatorship Germany could mobilize its resources more totally to military production than a democracy, even during the war.
Juha