[drgondog]

Ruy - I enjoyed re-reading the discussions and noted that for several of the posters there were misconceptions regarding the build up and relative strength of 8th FC as it related to operations and tactics.

Repositioning of LW S/E and T/E Fighter Force from East to Central Germany
The second not so well discussed facet of Operation POINTBLANK (or difference of opinion regarding the same facts) is the reaction by German command regarding the alarm created by 8th AF attacks in the summer of 1944, particularly culminating in the joint strikes by AAF and RAF on Hamburg and the re-organization of the Luftwaffe after Jeschonnek's suicide. That raid marked the end of the notion that Defense of the Reich could be adequately managed by LuftFlotte 3. The migration of experienced JG 3, JG 11, 27 and 53 started stripping the East and moving to defense of Reich. The result on expanding air operations from UK into the Reich had a two fold impact, namely reducing the LW activity in both East and South to one of defensive operations with far too few aircraft to play an important role in supporting the Wermacht, and developing a layered defense approach to Defense of the Reich.

By January 1944, 75% of German fighter strength opposing POINTBLANK was concentrated in Germany, the remainder between the Loire estuary and Norway (quoted from the Rise and Fall of the German Air Force - written by RAF General Staff).

LW night fighter units were also increasingly deployed in the late Summer and Fall 1943 with excellent results but had the effect of diminishing the threat to Bomber Command.

US Escort Fighter build up - from Q1 through Q4, 1943 - very significant but the P-47 augmentation not as impactful as the P-51
The US build up of Fighter strength was rapid. On the date of the Hamburg raids the 8th AF had three P-47 FG's (4th, 56th and 78th) which by that time had received VC's for 134 LW fighters. By the end of Feb 1944 the total VC's for the 4, 56 and 78FG's was 395... 96 of which during February 1944. By contrast the rest of the 10 operational 8th and 9th AF P-47 FG's from August 1943 through the end of February destroyed 243 more, P-38 's two operational FG's 52 and Mustang FG's (2) 144.

In January, 1944 the lone Mustang Group 354FG destroyed 145% of the combined 4th, 56th and 78th FG (46.5 to 32).

What is relevant about the statistics is that nearly all of the Mustang scores were from the Frankfurt to Hannover line - all the way to Berlin and Schweinfurt whereas the P-47 VCs' were dominantly achieved to and just past the German/Holland/Belgium/France borders

"There were Hundreds of Them"
Well, no. The 8th AF doctrine at full P-47D FG strength, augmented by 9th AF until June 1944, was to perform Penetration and Withdrawal escort to 8th BC due to lack of range capability past Stuttgart/Dummer Lake combat radius. The P-38's performed middle and long Target escort from Hannover to Berlin, from Kassel to Mulhausen, from Stuttgart to Freidrichshafen. The Mustang provided Target Escort from Hannover to Posnan/Stettin, from Kassel to Brux, from Frankfurt past Munich.

The Order of Battle for P-38s performing escort missions were 3 FG from March through April, five (including 9th AF) in June, one after July until late September.

The Order of Battle for 8th/9th AF Mustang's performing escort missions were 3 (4, 354, 357) during Big Week, five by March 9 (4, 354, 355, 357, 363), six by end of April (add 352), nine by mid May (4, 339, 352, 354, 355, 357, 359, 361, 363). June saw the diversion of two back to CAS duty in 9th AF (354, 363).

The 8th AF BC was comprised of 31 Bomb Groups in three Bomb Divisions, roughly 10 BG's each .

During a typical deep penetration raid pointed at one target, say Berlin, the 30+ Bomb groups were in trail, and with excellent formation and precise R/V, five 8th and 9th AF FG's plus several RAF squadrons of Spits would be escorting a string of bomber 60 miles long. If formations were strung out - 90-100 miles. Frequently there would be gaps between the P-47s running low and turning back while the P-51s were en route to pick their assigned bombers up and take them to the target and back until in range of Withdrawal support.

If you go back up and look at the total number of Mustang and P-38 FG's available for Big Week you will quickly note that a Maximum of one Long Range escort per 10 BG Bomb Division and One medium to long range P-38 FG per 10 BG's.

Simply stated the sky is a big place, the fighter squadrons are arranged in a dispersed fashion front, top and rear of say 50 B-17s over a 5 mile stretch, with the FG responsibility to cover two to three boxes of 40 to 50 bombers (or more). The LW was successful at detecting un-escorted bomber boxes and often attacked where the fighter coverage was nil, then dove away when the escorts arrived. But, LW could concentrate in mass and attack with significant Local superiority in a 20 mile span.

Additionally, the 8th AF FG commanders did not keep their jobs when they sent 40+ fighters after a few. The flight leaders were most often the attacking/defending force and more arrived when the battle escalated... but a squadron 5-10 miles in the rear would take several minutes to join the fight. Simply speaking there Never was much of a numerical advantage of the defending Mustang/Lightning fighter group, if any, over the attacking LW force in 1944.

Willy Reshke is often quoted, as are many other LW vets as saying "we fought against 10:1 odds".. If you could place every US 8th AF fighter Group in one section of the sky, it could achieve 10:1 over a fully equipped Gruppe - but that was impossible - more often it was One US fighter Group opposing one or more Gruppen in a local 10 cubic mile airspace.

I apologize for the length.

Bill