Quote:
Originally Posted by Paul Thompson
Bill, the crisis in summer 1943 was caused by several operations, of which the Hamburg raids were just a part. The most prominent action on the fighting fronts at the time was the collapse of the Axis forces in Sicily in July. This forced the halt of all operations on the Eastern front and precipitated the Italian armistice. With regard to strategic bombing, the Peenemunde and Ploesti raids in August 1943 were just as important as the attack on Hamburg.
Oh, I fully agree but Ploesti was only a couple of days after Hamburg firestorm. It was a far more important Political event although Ploesti was a far more serious thrust. Ditto Peenemude,
I’ve summarised the movements of 18 selected Gruppen below. Notice that several of these units moved to from the East to the Mediterranean and only then to the Western front. Several units were formed for air defence tasks in spring, so the crisis was being felt even before the summer:
1943 Gruppen:
I./JG27 Mediterranean (11.42) to West (1.43)
I./JG3 East to West 2.43
I./JG11 formed West 4.43
II./JG11 formed West 4.43
III./JG11 formed West 5.43
IV./JG3 formed West 6.43
II./JG3 East to West 8.43
III./JG3 East to West 8.43
II./JG27 East (7.41) to Mediterranean (9.41); Mediterranean to West 8.43
II./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 10.43
III./JG77 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 11.43
1944 Gruppen:
III./JG27 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 3.44
IV./JG27 formed Mediterranean 5.43; Mediterranean to West 4.44
I./JG53 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 5.44
III./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (11.41); Mediterranean to West 6.44
I./JG77 East to Mediterranean 7.42; Mediterranean to West 8.44
II./JG77 East (11.42) to Mediterranean (12.42); Mediterranean to West 8.44
IV./JG53 formed West 10.44
Regards,
Paul
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I agree all the detailed Gruppen movements as you have presented them.
Would note that several ZG and JG's moved into Defense of the Reich in fall 1943 and early winter 1944 that are not mentioned above. My previous notation was to reference movements as early as end of Battle of Kursk and near the Hamburg (and Ploesti/Peenemunde) times. II./JG 51 shows up in defense of Stuttgart in early September, for example and I don't see combat ops against 8th AF for JG 1 and JG 11 until July, 1943 (into Bfh Mitte). By August 17 all JG 1, JG2, JG3, JG11, JG 26 plus the ZG and NJG units committed plus I. and II./JG 27.
The KIA/WIA as a % of the sorties stayed at or below 10% for combined LF Reich and LF 3 through the end of 1943 but nearly doubled in January and February - finally jumping to 16%-25% between March and the end of May, 1944. To me, that is the most important statistic because a.) it coincides with the Mustang operations from January forward and b.) it is the most important of the 'required replacement' numbers that had to be met by LW Training and 'foraging' (from bomber and transport ranks).
Another point to ponder regarding loss of experienced pilots is that the WIA/KIA statistics very much reflect the increasing vulnerability of Me 110 and Do 217/Ju 88 crews from the NJG units as 'two for one' to aircraft lost - in which the gunner, while equally dead, did not contribute to the shortage of pilots. The number started ramping up in October 1943 as the P-38s entered service and started catching the T/e crews by surprise past the escort range of the P-47, then the P-51 in December further compounded the problem.
I have some stuff I owe you via email
Regards,
Bill