Quote:
Originally Posted by Peter Cornwell
Nobody can suggest that there was ever a problem with the number of fighters available to Fighter Command - BEAVERBROOK had that well under control. But there were growing concerns over the wastage rate of fighter pilots and the inexperience and/or continuing endurance of those remaining on strength. DOWDING's policy of rotating squadrons between Groups also resulted in a similar diminishing quality (though to a lesser extent) within his reserve pilot pool. Pilot attrition within RAF Fighter Command was on a knife-edge. But the continuing availability of serviceable airfields in southern England was the other major factor which brought us so close to imminent defeat in early September 1940.
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Peter, I read your books, I respect you as first rate historian, but still something I have to say, till early September 1940, both RAF and Luftwaffe had suffered serious losses, and both side were more or less exhausted, but as I said, while Keith's Group 11 was almost reach end of their strength, but Group 10 and 12 were in far better condition, that means RAF fighter commander HAD NOT exhausted their reserve yet, that fact combined with RAF still had enough modern fighters, it does not seem to me RAF was in the verge of IMMEDIATE defeat, see I do not exclude the possibility that Luftwaffe still would win the Bob if they did not switch their target in early September, the thing I do not agree is these claims that Germans had victory in their sight and only be taken away by some kind of Hilter's stupid order.