[John Vasco]

Fanair:
I'll tell you next week after I've had a good look through it.

As for the other comments of posters, I'll give my simple views (Peter C. will disagree with some of them - Hi Peter!)
I agree with Peter re the quality of pilots as the Battle wore on. But one must also balance that with the quality of replacement pilots/aircrew with the Luftwaffe units ranged against Fighter Command. Allied to that is the manning levels of Lw units, and their aircraft complement, as the Battle wore on. Erhard Milch did a round of units starting on 20th August 1940 and highlighted shortages on both fronts (30 pilots short at JG 26, for example). He did another round between 27th August and 4th September and found things had become even worse. Chapter 23 (page 285 et seq.) of Stephen Bungay's excellent 'The Most Dangerous enemy' covers it all.
Also, when talking of pilot strength in Fighter Command, Dowding's view was that a Squadron was up to strength when it had 16 pilots. Now that is a sensible approach given the need to factor in losses, but the plain fact is that I do not know of one example where all 16 pilots from one squadron were up at the same time. What Dowding was doing was building in 'slippage' in the classic manner of running a 'Project' (for want of a better word). The net result being, as Bungay points out, that Fighter Command had more pilots on charge in October 1940 than when they entered the Battle in July!
Airfields? We had already pulled back from Manston by 24th August. That did not materially affect the prosecution of the Battle, and it was always considered that if more airfields were reduced to the state of Manston, then squadrons would operate from slightly further back. Some might say that moving back would lead one into the 'Big Wing' scenario of getting up too late - I would counter by saying go read Laddie Lucas's book on Bader. The whole Big Wing idea is explained in great clarity, and shows that over many, many, decades, most people have got hold of the wrong end of the strick completely (might get grief over this, but go read the book first and then come back to me). Fact is, there were enough airfields to maintain the presence of RAF fighter squadrons in the air even if more were put in the same state as Manston, even if those squadrons were based further back.
As for any airborne invasion, go check out the losses during the Western Campaign in the Ju52/3 units to see just what their capacity/capability was for an airborne invasion. If you can get hold of a copy, read Johannes Kaufmann's book (the title of which escapes me, but it might be 'Mein Fliegerleben') in which he describe the situation post-Western campaign (he flew Ju52/3s, later transferring to SKG 210). Not going to happen.
Seaborne invasion? In the light of what we know now, and the enormous planning and logistics required for D-Day 6th June 1944, barges ploughing across the Channel at 2 mph would have little realistic chance even BEFORE any interdiction by the RAF or Royal Navy.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but it DOES feed in to objective critical thinking and re-evaluation of events. And I say this full in the knowledge that in 1940, the defenders of our Island could not 'see over the other side of the hill' as much as they wanted to, or needed to...