[quote=Nick Beale;228266]
Quote:
I think it falls a bit short, regarding the logistical situation of the Luftwaffe in June and July in France. Would it really have been possible for the Wehrmacht to do this stunt?[\QUOTE]
From my reading of the deciphered signal traffic for the period (which is a far from complete picture of course) the Luftwaffe was far too busy restoring communications, supplies and serviceability on a mass of new and unfamiliar bases to do more than it actually did in the immediate aftermath of the French capitulation. Also the Kriegsmarine was just about nowhere with assembling the necessary shipping (see the monthly War Diaries of the German Naval Staff Operations Division: https://archive.org/search.php?query...Sorter&page=2). Then the Army had to train troops for amphibious ops — so there were a lot of obstacles for the Wehrmacht to overcome.
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Right, but the authors basic strategy is a landing by paras and Ju 52 transported troops on a small perimeter near Folkestone, after the navy is decimated by a fake landing attempt in the nortsea. Thereby the Luftwaffe, supported by Me 109s with extended range with drop tanks, will be able to reach local air superiority. The use of the Luftwaffe is tactical and not as in the real battle strategical with bombing the quite irrelevant London.
The historical strategy of SEALION with a broad landing with insufficient naval ressources would have been impossible to support as you rightly point out!
There is a lot of thought on the actual planning en datail in the book, that seems to be written by someone who knew a real lot of historical and technical details.