EXTRACTS FROM TICOM REPORT I-112 :
VOLUME 9--GERMAN TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNICATIONS
Lt. Werner RASCH, of the 353rd German Air Force Signal
Intelligence Regiment in the East, gives the folloving account
ot the development and achievements of the Russian Long Range
Bomber Forces (ADD--Avitsiya Dalneye Dyestviya).
"Soon after the outbreak of the Russian-German .
war, practically allot the Russian Long Range Bomber
Porce was destroyed, either by German attacks on
Russian airfields, or in combat with Geman fighters.
What was lett of it was withdrawn from action. Marshall
GOLOVANOV, chief of ADD, reorganized his forces
with the intention of using them in night opera~ions
only, owing to the threat presented by the strong
German flak defense. The first successful operations
following the reorganization took place in the battle
of Stalingrad (September 1942 - February 1943).
From then on, ADD operations played an important part
in all Russian ottens1ves. The training for night
operations was of long duration; at the end of'the
war each bomber reg1ment had crews which were still in
a training status. .
"The achievements of' the ADD units were not -
very impressive. Crews were not trained tor carrying
out night attacks in close formation. In the
latter days of the war 60 aircraft of a division
need approximately one hour to assemble and take
off, and even this was accomplished only- under the
most favourable navigational and meteorological
conditions. In planning an attack, each division
was allotted 20 minutes over the target; in that
time it was intended that all aircraft or one division
should have completed their mission and moved out to
make room for the next division. Unless targets on
the front itself were being raided, the front line
was usually crossed before dark. This permitted the take-off
to be made during daylight, and the first aircraft
to take of were held in an assembly area in order
that a close-flying formation be formed. Formations
equipped with radio-telephone communications were
again brought into close order by the leading
aircraft of the regiments before going into the
bomb run. Each regiment had several Pathfinder aircraft,
which were flown by the most experienced crews.
Since the success of the mission depended upon the1r
efforts. In addition to theflares, they usually
carried a 1,,000 pound bomb.
Point-to-Point Nets. --These po1nt-to-point nets of the
Long Range Bomber Forces (ADD) alone were a sufficient basis
on Which the Germans could build up an accurate picture ot
the ADD organization. When the 18th Russian Air Army was
reorganized the Germans immediately recognized such steps
from traffic on these nets. The most profitable traffic in these nets from an intelligence standpoint, came from units which were widely separated in the field as this necessitated the use of radio facilities for communication. In instances where the units were close together very little s1gnal
intelligence could be gained since there was slight need tor
radio transmissions.
From the intercept and analysis of traffic on these
point-to-point nets movements ot the Russian Air Army units,
locations and occupations of airfields numbers of operational
and unoperational aircraft and locations of supply dumps
could be determined. Traffic intercepted-on these nets
also gave the Germans considerable information regarding
intended operations and offensives. One outstanding success
along this line occurred when a Russian order to bomber units
was intercepted by the Germans. The message ordered an
attack on Shavli, Lithuania, where an entire German Panzer
Army was immobilized due to a lack of sufficient fuel.
The German Signal Intelligence Service reported the information to
the Lufttlotte which provided fighters to meet the Russian Long Range Bombers while German JU 52' s dropped gasoline supplies to the encircled Panzer Army and enabled it to escape.
Call Signs and Frequencies. --Three-character call signs were used in the radio nets between the Air Army and Air Corps. They were changed once during the day and once at night, at which time the frequencies also were changed.
I. Call signs were based on an arbitrary combination of letters and digits and were selected from a call sign list that changed monthly. The Germans were unable to determine whether any definite system was employed for the choosing of the call signs. They did notice however that during the course of a month a call sign used by a given radio station might be repeated without the succession of call signs which had followed at the time of the previous occurrence. Traffic between corps and divisions took place with a periodic change of call signs, but on fixed trequenc1es. This fact aided the intercept tasks of the German Signal Intelligence."
…
"a. Supply Traffic. --Valuable intelligence was obtained
by the German Signal Intelligence from the interception of [RUSSIAN] radlo traffic which gave details on supplies of fuel, ammunition and other materials. Details of railway movements of
supplies were transmitted by the District Air Base Depots to
thier subordinate airfield battalions. These messages contained information on the destination, number or railway cars being used, amount and type of supplies, and the scheduled time of arrival. When the trains arrived at their destination a message announcing their arrival was sent to the airfield battalions. As a result ot the exploitation of this type of traffic the Germans were able to bomb successfully the stations soon after trainloads or fuel and ammunition had arrived. In the Southern sector a service Command point-to-point radio net reported arrivals of replacement
aircraft tor the 17th, 5th, and 8th Air Armies. These replacement
planes were ferried from the factories to the airfields. Tactical'. units down to regimental level receipted for these planes and supplies, and from interception of these strength reports the Germans were able to estimate the production and distribution rate of Russian planes.
Current fuel and ammunition supplies at airfields were reported on pre-arranged message forms transmitted by the air-field battalions. These messages, since fuel and ammunition supplies were always increased prior to an offensive, afforded the Germans a sund basis for predicting impending Russian offensives.
b. Miscellaneous Air Service Command Traffic. --The
Russian Air Service Command reported by radio on the achievements in salvaging German aircraft which had been shot down or which had been forced to land. These reports afforded
the Germans with a source of informat1on concerning their missing crews, and in many, cases it was possible for the Germans to inform families that the crew members were alive and were Russian prisoners of war. Reports of interrogation of captured German military personnel were also often transmitted and intercepted by the Germans. In some cases as a result of the information contained in these reports, the German Command carried out court martial proceedings in absentia where the intercepted information carried sufficient proof that the German prisoners of war had revealed information of a secret nature. An Air service Command of
the 8th Russian Air Army on the southern front reported routes
to be flown by aircraft in large-scale ground attacks, giving
the time at which the attack would take place. For such attacks the Russian Air Army usually ordered the placing of smoke markers in the frontal area on the day before the attack would take place. These smokemarkers were used by the Russian planes as an orientation point, and not only indicated the proposed direction to be flown, but also corresponded to the direction the ground force would advance. After a study of these smoke signals the German Air Force Slgnial Intelligence learned that the signals were lit
thirty minutes to an hour before the actual time of attack.
Thus, when it was learned that smoke signals had been set
out the German Signal Intelligence could usually inform the Air and Ground forces some twenty-four hours in advance of plans tor a Russian offensive."